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PRIVATE ACTORS & STRUCTURAL BALANCE:
MILITIA & THE FREE RIDER PROBLEM IN
PRIVATE PROVISION OF LAW
Andrew P. Morriss*
Miners in Montana in the 1860s created "common law," non-
governmental legal institutions which dispensed millions of dol-
lars of public resources to private individuals. Armed Vigilantes
rode across the territory administering private justice. They
hung twenty-two men, including an elected sheriff and his dep-
uties. Even as Montana finally became a territory in May 1864,
"it nevertheless chose still to regard itself as back of beyond, as a
remote, independent, and untouchable empire. It resented and
continually obstructed, ungratefully, the federal controls which
accompanied the blessings of territorial recognition."' Such ac-
tivities were not limited to the early days of the Montana Terri-
tory: cattlemen led by Granville Stuart in Montana pursued and
hung rustlers in the 1890s, to widespread popular approval.
Today the State of Montana and many Montanans celebrate
and honor these men and their activities. Montana's state capitol
building includes what is almost a shrine to the 1863-64 Vigilan-
tes; the state highway patrol includes the Vigilante symbol on its
shoulder patches;2 Helena's main street, still called Last Chance
Gulch, follows the site of mining activity and celebrates as heroic
* Associate Professor of Law and Associate Professor of Economics, Case
Western Reserve University. A.B. (Public Affairs), Princeton, 1981; J.D., M. Pub. Aff.,
The University of Texas at Austin, 1984; Ph.D. (Economics), Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, 1994. I thank Carol Akers, Tom Bogart, Don Boudreaux, Mel
Durchslag, Jonathan Entin, and Wendy Wagner for taking the time to comment on
this piece. Commenting of course does not imply agreement. Special thanks to Roy
Mersky and Marlin Robinson at the Jamail Center for Legal Research, The Universi-
ty of Texas at Austin, for sharing their collection of Militia materials. The editors of
the Montana Law Review, Symposium panelists, and the Symposium audience also
offered many helpful comments and questions. Once again, Alice Hunt provided su-
perb secretarial assistance.
1. JOSEPH KINSEY HOwARD, MONTANA: HIGH, WIDE AND HANDSOME 39 (1959).
2. The Montana Vigilantes used "3-7-77" as a symbol. Explanations for the
meaning of these numbers are limited only by the imagination. Among the theories I
have come across are (1) the targets of vigilante action were given 3 hours, 7 min-
utes, and 77 seconds to leave the area; (2) the targets would be buried in graves 3
feet by 7 feet by 77 inches; (3) the vigilantes used numbers to identify themselves
and numbers, 3, 7, and 77 were particularly important members; and most likely, (4)
the vigilantes formation was related to three gatherings of Masons for the funeral of
a member, and at those gatherings there were, respectively, 3, 7, and 77 Masons
present.
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the miners' exploitation of the public domain; guided tours of
Bannack State Park glorify the Vigilantes; and cattlemen such
as Granville Stuart appear as heroes in most modern Montana
history books.
Today's Militias3 bear a striking resemblance to these pio-
neers. Like the Vigilantes, the Militias are attempting to reorder
society through private means. Like the gold seekers and cattle-
men, they assert their right to create and enforce property
rights. Yet the modern Militias and their sympathizers find
themselves reviled4 and, sometimes, as in Montana, subject to
3. The term 'Militia' encompasses a wide range of organizations and is freely
available for use by anyone who chooses to do so. It is likely that some of the
groups self-identified as 'Militia' are indeed their detractors' worst nightmares: vio-
lent, racist nuts.
4. Polling data is surprisingly sparse. All but two national polls conducted on
the Militia image were done just after the Oklahoma City bombing and so probably
overstate the hostility. I identified national polls by asking the Roper Center for
Public Opinion Research in Storrs, Connecticut to conduct a search of their database
for polling data on Militias on September 3, 1996 (hereinafter Roper Center Polls)
(on file with author). The Roper Center Polls identified questions from Time/CNN
polls conducted on April 27, 1995 and July 10, 1996, a CBS News poll conducted on
April 25, 1995, ABC News/Washington Post polls conducted on May 10-14, 1995, Los
Angeles Times polls conducted on April 26 and 27, 1995 and April 13-16, 1996, and
an NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll conducted June 2-6, 1995.
Three polls asked multiple Militia-related questions, all in 1995: the Los An-
geles Times poll, the Time/CNN poll, and the ABC News/Washington Post poll. In
Question 10, the Los Angeles Times poll asked about an "armed citizen militia" and
found 46% believed the Militia had a "great deal/good amount" of responsibility for
the Oklahoma City bombing compared to 31% which believed they had "not too
much/none" of the responsibility. In Question 12, 59% thought an "armed citizen mili-
tia" posed a "grave danger to American society" while only 24% thought they were
"mostly just groups of citizens lawfully exercising their rights to assemble and bear
arms." (According to Question 27, more people had an opinion about Militias than
the 68% who responded that they had heard or read "anything" about "armed citizen
militia groups . . . which strongly oppose the federal government and gun control in
particular." Perhaps most remarkably, Question 18 indicated that 17% named "citizen
anti-government militia groups, right wing militia groups" as responsible for the
Oklahoma City bombing (and this only a week after the bombing), ahead even of
suspect Timothy McVeigh and his friends (14%) and "mentally ll/nuts/whackos" (9%)
and behind only "Don't Know" (28%)).
A short while later, Question 27E of the Yankelovich, Inc. Time/CNN poll re-
vealed that only 30% described "militia groups . . . that have organized themselves
because they believe the federal government has too much power" as "well-inten-
tioned" while 58% would not so describe them. More dramatically, according to Ques-
tions 27D, 27C, 27B, and 27C, 63% described them as "[a] threat to our way of life"
(26% did not), 55% described them as "crazy" (33% did not), 80% described them as
"dangerous" (11% did not), and only 21% described them as "patriots" (65% did not).
Finally, a May 1995 ABC News/Washington Post poll asked about "armed
private militia groups," and Question 21 revealed that 68% agreed the militias were
the "greater threat to your own personal rights and freedoms" while 22% agreed that
the federal government was the greater threat. Answers to Questions 14, 15, 16, 17,
19971 PRIVATE ACTORS 117
prosecution under a "criminal syndicalism" statute,5 although
their actions are far less extreme than that of their ideological
forefathers.
Times have changed and celebrating a vigilante past need
not mean we want to live in a vigilante present. However, there
are striking similarities between the Militias' complaints about
the balance between the State6 and private society and the prob-
lems faced by Westerners in the nineteenth century. These links
between our past and our present ought to make us hesitate
before rejecting the Militias' contributions to political dialogue,
even as we recognize the significant flaws in their ideologies.
The Militias are a response to changes in the structure of
our society. Although these changes have many diverse impacts,
one of the most crucial is the increasing reliance on State legal
institutions rather than on private, customary legal institutions
to solve societal problems. While the Militias are not the only
response possible, they are a response well within the traditions
of United States political discourse. In Section I, I provide some
definitions and describe the free rider problems inherent in pri-
vate solutions to public problems. In Section II, I discuss the role
of different types of law in our society's structure and the
and 30J: 44% were "afraid" of "armed private militia groups" and 53% were not; 10%
trusted them and 83% did not; 24% saw them as a "major threat to your personal
rights and freedoms," 25% as a minor threat, and 48% as not a threat; 13% support-
ed the "overall goals and activities" of the militia either somewhat or strongly, while
82% opposed them somewhat or strongly; and 11% had a somewhat or very favorable
impression of the groups (77% somewhat or very unfavorable).
Some of the negative results of these polls are undoubtedly due to the phras-
ings of the questions and timing of the polls. Even if those factors cut support for
militia in half, however, their overall image is still quite negative.
5. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-105 (1995). Some have called for a response
from the state or federal governments to restrain Militias. For example, the Anti-
Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith has proposed a model "Paramilitary .Training
Statute" to control Militias. We must be wary of those who use the Militias as an
excuse to limit our civil liberties. For example, Congressman Charles Rangel writes
in his introduction to The Limits of Dissent that "[niothing in our Constitution pro-
tects those who cross the line into violence, and we must deal sternly with those
who do." THOMAS HALPERN & BRLN LEVIN, THE LIMITS OF DISSENT xii (1996). Ev-
erything in our constitution protects those who "cross the line into violence," or any
other line for that matter. The government may not, for example, use torture to
obtain confessions from those it apprehends or deny them jury trials. Rhetorical
excess from Militia opponents like Rangel are, ironically, the mirror image of the ex-
tremist rhetoric of some of the Militias' members which so concern Militia opponents.
See also MORRIS DEES & JAMES CORCORAN, GATHERING STORM 224-28 (1996) (calling
for state and federal laws to prohibit Militia activities, prohibition on Militia mem-
bers serving in the military or National Guard, and policy data gathering).
6. I will use the capitalized word "State" to distinguish the government in
general from the fifty state governments.
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Militias' views on these issues, which I compare to historical
examples from the nineteenth century American West. I then
suggest ways in which the Militias can contribute to solving the
problems identified earlier. Finally, I conclude with a brief anal-
ysis of the Militias' potential to play a constructive societal role.
I. AUTHORITARIAN LAW, CUSTOMARY LAW, AND THE FREE RIDER
PROBLEM
Legal professionals' focus on the State often leads us to for-
get that the formal legal system is only a small part of the web
of relationships that structure our society and function as law.
For the rest of society, however, formal legal rules are frequently
not central, and sometimes are irrelevant. Robert Ellickson, for
example, has documented how small a role the formal legal rules
and courts play in Shasta County, California.7 "Law" must be
defined more broadly than the formal legal rules issued by legis-
latures and courts.
Law can be divided into two categories according to its
source: authoritarian and customary.8 Authoritarian law is dis-
tinguished by its reliance on the State's monopoly on the use of
force for enforcement. Customary law, on the other hand, gener-
ally relies on consent, and so physical force, or the potential for
physical force, generally plays a less important role in its en-
forcement.9 Under customary law, compliance with rules is often
voluntary and typically induced by reputational sanctions.
Both types of law can serve purposes in addition to dispute
resolution.1" An important, but neglected, function of customary
law is its role as part of the regulatory mechanism between the
various centers of power in our society. For this reason, Lon
Fuller argued that privately produced customary law is a
"branch of constitutional law, largely and properly develop[ed]
outside the framework of our written constitutions."1 Because
7. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991).
8. See BRUCE BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW 12 (1990).
9. See BENSON, supra note 8, at 14.
10. Individuals can resolve disputes by seeking resolution in a customary law
tribunal just as they can through a lawsuit in the State courts. Some, and only
some, customary law tribunals rely on the existence of State-backed enforcement
mechanisms. For example, one can seek enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate in
court under certain circumstances. Other customary law institutions do not. See
BENSON, supra note 8, at 30-35.
11. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 128 (1964). Positivists like John
Austin, however, define law as a command of the sovereign, see JOHN AUSTIN, THE
PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., 1995), and so
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Americans are accustomed to thinking of "constitutional law" as
only the authoritarian law surrounding the interpretation of our
written Constitution, I will refer to the mix of private and au-
thoritarian law governing the relationships between centers of
power in our society as "structural law."12
Structural law requires a minimum of authoritarian law:
defining the relationships between the various levels and branch-
es of the State, for example, could hardly be done without some
degree of State involvement." Because structural law encom-
passes more than intra-State relations, however, a component of
customary law is necessary as well." The mix of customary and
authoritarian law can vary, and changes in the balance between
the two will have significant impacts on individuals' lives and
the structure of our society. Because we do not live in a minimal,
Nozickian State, 5 we have a great deal more authoritarian law
than needed to define the boundaries of the State.
One explanation for this reliance on more than the mini-
mum of authoritarian law is that law has significant public good
aspects and hence is underprovided (compared to the social opti-
mum) by private interests. 6 Underprovision of a good often oc-
curs when producers are unable to secure the full benefits of
their actions. In the case of law, William Landes and Richard
Posner have argued that neither the parties to disputes nor the
decision-makers resolving disputes can secure the benefits of the
production of precedent. 7 Because of this gap between the pub-
lic and private benefits of precedent the State must provide
would not accept the notion of privately created law.
12. Readers may thank, or not, Professor Melvin Durchslag for pointing out to
me how confusing my articulation of these ideas was before I applied a separate
term to this law. I certainly thank him.
13. It need not, of course, be done through a written constitution or through a
constitution treated as Americans treat theirs, as the examples of Great Britain and
Mexico demonstrate.
14. Even in an totalitarian state, the body of authoritarian law is likely to be
incomplete since even the most ambitious totalitarians find it difficult to fully occupy
the field of interpersonal relationships.
15. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). Indeed, we have a
lot of governments-more than 80,000, 60,000 of which have the power to tax. See
ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF AMER-
ICAN GOVERNMENT 6 (1987). Our relationships with them are governed by both au-
thoritarian and customary law. Our statutes and written constitutions only begin to
describe these relationships.
16. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private
Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979). See BENSON supra note 8, at 278-81 for a dis-
cussion of flaws in this argument.
17. See Landes & Posner, supra note 16, at 238.
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law.18 Faced with law's significant public good aspects, private
individuals may opt to "free ride" on the efforts of others to pro-
duce law to govern relationships. For example, individuals may
decide to walk away from contractual relationships rather than
pay the cost of creating the legal rules necessary to resolve a
dispute because they cannot charge future users of those rules.
By subsidizing the production of rules, therefore, the government
can lower the costs of both resolving disputes in the future and
of creating future private transactions. 19
Goods with public aspects can be produced by either private
or public means. ° Governments are, in part, an important
means of overcoming free rider and assurance problems in coop-
eratively providing such goods, but they are only one means of
doing so. We ought to choose governments as a means of supply-
ing a particular good with public aspects when the net benefits
of doing so exceed the net benefits possible with a customary law
situation.
When evaluating the benefits and costs of authoritarian law
solutions, we must remember that governments are also actors,
and just as they can help us avoid the problem of underprovision
of a good, they can also create problems. Although a complete
catalog of problems associated with government is beyond the
scope of this article, a good illustration is the potential for
overprovision of law. A government might not stop at creating a
narrow class of rules, for example, but continue to expand its
authority in a socially undesirable way over areas more efficient-
ly addressed by customary legal institutions. Problems arise
when the relationships among the various institutions estab-
lished to avoid underprovision of law get out of balance.
An understanding of the relationship of government to pri-
vate society requires a measure of the relationship. In Crisis and
Leviathan, Robert Higgs argues that conventional quantitative
measures of government, such as government spending, are
inadequate.2 ' Rather, Higgs proposed using the scope of the
State's effective authority over economic decision-making to
measure government: "[T]he extent to which governmental offi-
cials rather than private citizens effectively decide how resources
18. See id.
19. Parties could now incorporate the rules by reference. Their costs are also
reduced by the reduction in uncertainty the establishment of rules provides.
20. See DAVID SCHMIDTZ, THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT 81-104 (1991) (describing
private solutions to public good problems).
21. See HIGGS, supra note 15, at 27.
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will be allocated, employed, and enjoyed" measures both govern-
ment and the extent to which a society's structural law is made
of authoritarian law.2 When government has extensive authori-
ty over economic decision-making, it will have to make extensive
use of authoritarian law to regulate society. A government which
largely leaves economic decision-making to the private sector, on
the other hand, will likely have less authoritarian law.2"
I believe the Militias are a response to members' perception
of imbalances in the relationship between customary and author-
itarian law. These imbalances raise both constitutional and polit-
ical questions. Because the modern Militias fit within a well-
established tradition of private action to correct such imbalances,
thinking about Militias in these terms places the Militia move-
ment in context, suggests how they can play a constructive role
in our ongoing societal debate over the structure of our society,
and offers a perspective which explains some aspects of their
behavior.24
II. LAW, BALANCE, AND THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY
The structural law of our society is a complex set of interre-
lationships among individuals, private institutions, and State
entities governed by a mix of authoritarian and customary law.
Events can, and often do, change the balance of power in these
interrelationships and alter the mix of law governing them. A
change in power relations alone is not necessarily bad. If, for
example, the federal legislative and executive branches used
their new powers to defeat totalitarian dictators bent on world
conquest (as they did in World War II), even those with an ex-
tremely strong preference for individual liberty might find in-
creasing the State's powers preferable to the alternatives.25 Al-
22. Id. at 27-28.
23. A society could rely on authoritarian law to govern social relationships such
as marriage while leaving economic decision-making untouched.
24. The Militias' detractors' focus on the pathologies of individuals who have or
claim association with a highly decentralized, heterogeneous movement obscures the
Militias' role as a response to these serious imbalances.
25. Indeed, Robert Higgs argues that it is in part crises like World War II or
the Great Depression which allow governments to accumulate powers by creating
conditions which form a consensus in favor of collective action. See HIGGS, supra note
15, at 73-74. Combined with governments' tendency to adopt cost-concealing, com-
mand and control regimes to address the crises, such situations lead governments to
accumulate authority over additional areas of the economy. See id. Through what
Higgs terms "the ratchet effect," however, such powers are often not completely re-
leased when the crisis has passed and government power grows. See id. If govern-
ments are not entirely benign, and we seem to have fairly powerful evidence that
1997]
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though determining whether such changes are a net positive or
negative ultimately involves normative political questions, in-
creasing the reliance on authoritarian law generally produces
three negative effects. These effects suggest an increase in au-
thoritarian law should be of concern regardless of how those
normative questions are resolved.
First, increased reliance on authoritarian law creates addi-
tional opportunities for rent-seeking. 2 Three decades of public
choice scholarship has firmly established the potential for earn-
ing large economic rents through manipulation of the instru-
ments of government.2 7 For example, an industry may use gov-
ernment regulatory agencies to raise barriers to entry, thus
limiting competition. Because rent-seeking is wasteful and often
leads to other increased social costs, authoritarian law solutions
can cause significant social problems.28
Second, shifting from customary legal regimes to authoritari-
an law increases the cost of exiting from undesirable aspects of
particular legal regimes. Exit from a customary law regime is
rarely costless, but it is generally cheaper than exit from an
authoritarian law regime for several reasons. Authoritarian law
is usually imposed based upon physical boundaries and so exit
requires physically moving to a different jurisdiction. On the
other hand, customary law requires consent and is therefore less
frequently based on physical location. Members of trade associa-
tions, for example, may be geographically dispersed yet still
governed by the same rules. Additionally, when customary law
regimes involve market providers of legal services, they must
attract participants to survive. This in turn creates an incentive
to ease both entrance and hence exit from other customary re-
gimes."9 Moreover, because participants in a customary legal in-
they are not, we have created opportunities for rent-seeking or worse. See infra note
26 and accompanying text.
26. Rent-seeking is the expenditure of resources to capture economic rents,
which are payments "to a factor [of production] in excess of what is necessary to
keep it to its present employment." THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS
120 (David W. Pearce ed., 3d ed. 1986). The classic example is the expenditure of re-
sources to capture a monopoly position. See also JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF IN-
DUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 76-78 (1988) (discussing monopoly as rent-seeking).
27. See generally TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (James M.
Buchanan et al. eds., 1980).
28. For example, using government regulation to create barriers to entry can
reduce competition, leading to supra-competitive prices, misallocation of resources,
and reduced technological innovation.
29. Consider, for example, the market for individual long distance telephone
service in the United States. Carriers seeking to attract customers often offer to pay
122 [Vol. 58
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stitution can anticipate the possibility of exit ex ante, they have
an incentive to negotiate exit provisions before committing re-
sources. Increased exit costs raise the costs of errors in authori-
tarian law solutions because fewer people can afford to escape
the errors by switching regimes. Increased exit costs also raise
the probability of errors occurring because they reduce competi-
tive pressure to avoid them.
Third, areas governed by authoritarian law require a social
consensus on the rules, which is often costlier to achieve than
agreement among the smaller groups subject to customary law
regimes. There are reasons why we are sometimes willing to pay
those costs, of course. Uniformity and predictability, for example,
can lower transaction costs and may be cheaper to procure
through the government legal system. However, social consensus
on substantive rules can be costly and difficult.3 °
In addition to substantive social consensus, authoritarian
law also requires a social consensus to select governance rules.
Selecting decision-makers, for example, in the State legal system
is neither simple nor costless. Judges can be elected or appoint-
ed, subjected to retention procedures or granted life tenure, paid
well or poorly, and so forth. Deciding how to do these things not
only requires resources, but creates a class of losers whose pref-
erences are not satisfied by the chosen rule. Compare this to the
selection of arbitrators by the American Arbitration Association
("AAA") or private judges by firms like Judicial Arbitration and
Mediation Services ("JAMS"). If I object to Ohio's rather unusual
combination of partisan primaries and nonpartisan general elec-
tion of judges, I must leave the state to find an alternative. If I
object to AAA or JAMS procedures, I simply negotiate for a dif-
the transaction costs of transferring service.
30. Consider the "problem" of gun control. As even some gun control advocates
concede, "[g]uns are part of the way of life in many areas of the country, and . ..
the controversy over gun control reflects the complexity and range of lifestyles in our
country." THOMAS HALPERN, The Militia Movement, in THE LIMITS OF DISSENT, supra
note 5, at 1, 29. Handling the issue of concealed carry by authoritarian law requires
one rule for an entire jurisdiction; handling it by allowing private property owners to
deny access to their property to those carrying (or, presumably, not carrying) weap-
ons allows individuals to express their preferences in the marketplace. I could choose,
for example, to patronize only restaurants that do or do not allow patrons to carry
weapons. This is not an entirely fanciful example. Suzanne Gretia, whose parents
were among twenty-two people killed by a gunman in a Luby's cafeteria in Killeen,
Texas in 1991, later testified in favor of allowing the concealed carrying of weapons
because the Texas prohibition on concealed weapons had prompted her to leave her
gun in her car while dining. Had she been armed, she might have stopped the gun-
man before he killed her parents and others. See Paul Craig Roberts, Without Guns
to Go to a Victim's Defense, WASH. TIMES, July 24, 1994, at B3.
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ferent "brand" of arbitrator in my contract negotiations.
Finally, the displacement of customary law and institutions
by authoritarian law is related to a decline in social capital.
Social capital matters because
[flor a variety of reasons, life is easier in a community blessed
with a substantial stock of social capital. In the first place,
networks of civic engagement foster sturdy norms of general-
ized reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social trust.
Such networks facilitate coordination and communication, am-
plify reputations, and thus allow dilemmas of collective action
to be resolved. When economic and political negotiation is em-
bedded in dense networks of social interaction, incentives for
opportunism are reduced. At the same time, networks of civic
engagement embody past success at collaboration, which can
serve as a cultural template for future collaboration. Finally,
dense networks of interaction probably broaden the
participants' sense of self, developing the "I" in the "we," or (in
the language of rational-choice theorists) enhancing the
participants' "taste" for collective benefits.3'
Social capital is also important because of the deep penetration
of voluntary customary law into our society. Bruce Benson, for
example, has shown how far private legal systems and private
law enforcement have penetrated our society. His research indi-
cates that at least three-quarters of business disputes are settled
through private arbitration and mediation based on business
custom rather than state or federal law, and private police out-
number public police by more than two to one.32
A society out of balance risks damaging these vital private
relationships. At the same time, keeping the mixture of authori-
tarian and customary law in balance is subject to a serious free
rider problem. To an even greater extent than the case of provid-
ing precedent, the benefits of a balance in structural law are
hard to capture. Contributing further to the problem is the cor-
rect perception that the efforts of any individual are unlikely to
determine the success in creating or maintaining any particular
balance.
31. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J.
DEMOC. 65, 67 (1995).
32. See BENSON, supra note 8, at 2.
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A. Views of Imbalances
Militias discuss changes in American society in terms of
structural balance between citizens and the State. For example,
the Militia of Montana quotes James Madison and others to
support their claim that "[t]he best defense against the usurpa-
tion of these freedoms by the tyranny of a run-away, out of con-
trol government is a well informed and well prepared Unorga-
nized Militia of Citizens of the State of Montana and of the other
States of the Federal Union.""3 Militia of Montana leader John
Trochmann spoke in similar terms, telling a Yale University
audience, "Folks, we don't want a revolution. We want the nation
back in order."3
Defending freedom can cover a wide variety of actions; there-
fore, we need to look more closely at the Militias' intentions. My
own reading of the Militias' statements suggests that they have
three major concerns with the State's role in society today:
(1) government is "too weak"; (2) government is "too far away";
and (3) government is "too large."" There are significant paral-
lels between the Militias' concerns today and the problems of
structural balance faced by the residents of nineteenth century
Montana and the American West more generally.
33. The Militia of Montana (visited June 18, 1996) <http://www.nidlink.com/
-bobhard/mom.html> (on file with the Montana Law Review).
34. Yen Cheong, Militia Chief Assails Federal Stewardship (visited Feb. 17,
1997) <http-J/www.yale.edu/ydn/paper/10.27/ 10.27.95storyno.CE.html> (on file with the
Montana Law Review). Similarly, the Stark County Unit of the Ohio Unorganized
Militia's charter sets forth three purposes:
[(1)] to uphold, guard, and defend the Constitution of the United States of
America (as amended), the Bill of Rights, and the Constitution of the Ohio
Republic (as amended) against all enemies, both foreign and domestic; [(2)]
to provide a vigilant group to guard against attempts to diminish the mean-
ing, worth or value [of those constitutions; and (3)] to provide a well-
trained, locally-available group of persons to serve in case of local, state or
national emergency.
Stark County Unit of the Ohio "Unorganized" Militia-Unit Charter Summary (visited
July 1, 1996) <httpJ/members.aol. com/starkmil/charter.html> (on file with the Mon-
tana Law Review).
35. The Militias offer a variety of explanations for why these changes have
occurred. Some of these explanations rest on historical and legal theories which can,
at best, be described as unusual. Regardless of the accuracy, of their descriptions of
causation, however, the Militias have identified important problems.
1997]
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1. Too Weak
A government which appears frighteningly strong when it
confronts individuals can also appear too weak when it is unable
to shield individuals from the effects of external forces. One
example of this is the disappearance or weakening of programs
which previously shielded Americans from international market
forces, such as agricultural subsidies and tariff barriers.38 This
exposure to world market forces creates a perception of a weak-
ened government among many Americans. This perceptions is
shared by many Militia members.
a. The Militias
The increasing globalization of the American economy has
caused widespread dislocation, particularly in rural areas.37
This dislocation creates a perception of State weakness, which in
turn feeds the more conspiratorial aspects of the Militias' ideolo-
gies.3" One function of conspiracy theories is to explain incom-
prehensible events, reducing feelings of helplessness by identify-
ing a cause for a problem.39
36. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Terrorism, Technology and Govern-
ment Information of the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 104th Cong., (1995) (hereinafter
Hearings) (statement of John E. Trochman, Militia of Montana) available in LEXIS,
Legis Library, Curnws File (stating that "the average citizen must work for half of
each year just to pay their taxes, while billions of our tax dollars are . . . sent to
bail out the banking elite; while our fellow Americans are homeless, starving, and
without jobs").
37. See, e.g., SEYMOUR M. LIPSET & EARL RAAB, THE POLITICS OF UNREASON
428-29 (1978) (arguing that extremist movements are largely filled with ordinary
people caught in the stress of losing their position in the world).
Even opponents of the Militias see a connection. For example, an anti-Militia
article on the Internet argues:
With banks foreclosing on farms and federal marshals evicting farm fami-
lies, with jobs heading south of the border under the NAFTA trans-national
economic regime, and with police forces routinely trampling the Bill of
Rights to enforce unjust drug and gun laws, Americans have legitimate
reasons to be angry at their government.
Manny Goldstein, The Militia Movement: Enemy or Pawn of the State? (visited Sept.
4, 1996) <httpJ/mediafilter.org/MFF/S36/S36.MILITIA.html> (on file with the Montana
Law Review). Similarly, Brian Levin argues that "[p]eople's expectations about their
security and their future have changed over the last twenty years .... The security
that used to exist in the agrarian and manufacturing sectors is not there today."
LEVIN, Militias and the Constitution, in THE LIMITS OF DISSENT, supra note 5, at 53.
38. See JOHN GEORGE & LAIRD WILCOX, AMERICAN EXTREMISTS 80 (1996) (ex-
plaining the function of conspiracy theories in extremist movements generally).
39. The Militias' explanation for the apparent acquiescence of the federal gov-
ernment to these changes is that it is the result of individual's betrayal rather than
the result of global economic trends beyond the control of any individual. The United
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Even success in the global arena has created an appearance
of weakness. In "winning" the Cold War, we lost the organizing
principle which defined American interests in the world for more
than four decades.' The loss of a monolithic enemy brought
with it confusing conflicts in which American interests are un-
clear: without the overriding American-Soviet conflict to frame
our national interests, American interests in Somalia's feuding
warlords or Balkan disputes are hard to understand. Confusing
explanations from our national leaders (when they bother to
explain at all) combined with our growing reliance on multilater-
al mechanisms for handling such conflicts is more evidence for
the Militias of a weakened government unable to protect Ameri-
cans against an increasingly hostile world.41
b. Historical Precedent
Similarly, government was too weak to protect miners from
a well-organized criminal gang during Montana's gold rush.42
States' ratification of agreements to enter the World Trade Organization and NAFTA
are frequently cited by the Militias as examples of federal officials' betrayals.
40. Mainstream conservative writer Joseph Sobran went so far as to argue that
"the U.S. government has, in a sense, succeeded too well. It has outlived its foreign
enemies, and can no longer count on feeling needed to protect us from evil abroad."
Joseph Sobran, The Crisis of Statism, FREE MARKET NEWSLETTER (July 1994), re-
printed in 4 ANTISHYSTER 4 (1994). The AntiShyster, a far-right anti-lawyer publica-
tion, editorialized that Sobran's column was "evidence of a shift in the mainstream
media's attitudes. Ideas and attitudes of the sort espoused by 'fringe' publications
like the AntiShyster are beginning to be recognized, understood, and repeated in the
mainstream media. Middle America is sure to follow." Id. at 3.
41. See, e.g., Trochmann testimony at Senate Hearing, supra note 36 (citing U.S.
troops "ordered and controlled" by the U.N.); see HALPERN, supra note 30, at 8-9
(Gulf War produced "a vision of the subordination of the United States to an inter-
national collective, resulting in the surrender of its national sovereignty and the
stripping away of freedoms that Americans enjoy .... It really stands the American
victory in the Cold War on its head.").
42. For a more detailed discussion of the Montana Vigilantes, as well as other
vigilante groups in this context, see Andrew P. Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes, & Cattle-
men: Overcoming the Free Rider Problem in the Private Provision of Law (work in
progress on file with the author). The history of the vigilantes is set out in a num-
ber of sources. The best contemporary sources are NATHANIEL P. LANGFORD, VIGI-
LANTE DAYS AND WAYS (1996), and THOMAS J. DIMSDALE, THE VIGILANTES OF MON-
TANA (1953) (originally published as a series in the Montana Post beginning in 1865).
For a revisionist approach, arguing the vigilantes were actually motivated by jealousy
and sectional prejudice, see R. E. MATHER & F. E. BOsWELL, VIGILANTE VICTIMS:
MONTANA's 1864 HANGING SPREE (1991) and R. E. MATHER, HANGING THE SHERIFF
(1987). Although Mather and Boswell have done an impressive job of uncovering pre-
viously unknown facts about Plummer and the other road agents, I find their theory
unconvincing because it ultimately rests on the lack of evidence rather than on posi-
tive evidence. See Morriss, supra, for a more detailed discussion of their analyses.
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Led by Henry Plummer,' the Bannack road agents won control
of the elected sheriffs office" and created a sophisticated com-
munications network. This "system of horseback telegraphy as
unfailing as electricity"45 used spies in local businesses to relay
information about targets, signal robbers when to attack, avoid
capture, intimidate witnesses, and delay targets to allow time for
an attack.' Plummer's road agents killed over a hundred men
during the time they controlled the roads near Bannack and
Virginia City.47 In sum, Plummer's road agents were a success-
ful, highly organized, and brutal criminal syndicate which had
more available armed force than any other organization in south-
western Montana in 1863.
The road agents exploited the free rider problem in provision
of law in two ways. First, because they controlled the sheriffs
office, authoritarian law posed no problem. Second, as vigilante
Nicholas Langford's description of conditions makes clear, the
road agents ensured there was no individual incentive to resist:
When appealed to for combination and resistance to the fearful
power now growing into an absolute and bloody dictatorship,
[people] . . . based their refusal upon selfish and personal con-
siderations. They could not act without endangering their lives.
43. Plummer had previously operated in Idaho in 1861. After his gang "mur-
dered a jovial saloon owner named Hildebrandt, there was a meeting at Lewiston to
discuss possible action, but the plausible Plummer talked so strongly on the horrors
of anarchy that nothing was done." WILLIAM S. GREEVER, THE BONANZA WEST: THE
STORY OF THE WESTERN MINING RusHEs 1848-1890 261-62 (1963); see also LANGFORD,
supra note 42, at 20; HOFFMAN BIRNEY, VIGILANTEs 68-69 (1929).
44. The Sheriff was the "official" government of the area, although the office
seems to have been solely a creation of local control. Plummer almost became deputy
U.S. Marshal for the area as well. See LANGFORD, supra note 42, at 138-39.
45. Id. at 143. Even after the organization of the Vigilantes, the system con-
tinued to function because the Vigilantes were unaware for some time of the identity
of the messengers. See DIMSDALE, supra note 42, at 126. In carrying word of the
Vigilantes' formation, a messenger to the road agents was "traveling with such rapid-
ity as to kill two horses." Id. at 127.
46. See LANGFORD, supra note 42, at 142 (describing the road agents' placement
as spies in businesses); see id. at 140 (describing how a road agent worked as a
clerk at a ranch where horses were kept and would inform the gang of merchant's
movements); see id. at 143 (describing the system for marking vehicles); see id. 144-
48 (describing operation of the system in one robbery); see id. 161 (describing how
Plummer gave one intended victim a colored scarf to mark him); see BIRNEY, supra
note 43, at 169-70 (describing scarf story); DIMSDALE, supra note 42, at 70 ("road
agents had a private mark on the coach when it carried money").
47. See LANGFORD, supra note 42, at 12-15 (102 killed); DIMSDALE, supra note
42, at 15 (more than 100 killed); BIRNEY, supra note 43, at 162 (102 killed). In gen-
eral, the road agents chose their victims well. They did not attack in the mines, for
example, where the miners' courts would have quickly rallied against them, but at-
tacked individuals on the highway.
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They intended to leave the country as soon as their claims were
worked out. They would be driven from their claims, and
robbed of all they had taken from them, if they engaged in any
active opposition to the roughs; whereas, if they remained pas-
sive, and attended to their own business, there was a chance
for them to take their money back to their families. It was
impossible to assemble a meeting for the purpose of considering
and discussing with safety, the condition and exposure of the
people.'
Despite the road agents' superior organization and weather con-
ditions which hampered movement, the Vigilantes ultimately
defeated the road agents. The Vigilance Committee hung twenty-
two members of Plummer's gang (including Plummer and his
principal deputies) between December 21, 1863 and February 3,
1864, and other members fled the Territory.49 Perhaps most
remarkably, the Vigilance Committee ceased its operations after
eliminating the road agents without conducting a general purge
of either suspected wrongdoers or political opponents5 ° and is
generally acknowledged to have made only one "mistake."51
48. LANGFORD, supra note 42, at 107-08.
49. See DIMSDALE, supra note 42, at 23-24. Callaway estimates there may easily
have been at least 50 in the "inner circle" with a hundred more allies. LEW. L.
CALLAWAY, MONTANA'S RIGHTEOUS HANGMEN: THE VIGILANTES IN ACTION 20 (1982);
Birney lists 38 names and estimates membership in the gang was more than 50. See
BIRNEY, supra note 43, at 127.
50. Since the Committee operated during a time of deep political passions in
Montana over the Civil War (Montana had many Southern sympathizers), its self-re-
straint is even more remarkable.
51. The one "mistake" made by the Vigilance Committee was their execution of
"Captain" Joseph A. Slade. Slade had been a famous and tyrannical stage company
agent. For example, he cut off another man's ears and carried them with him. See
CALLAWAY, supra note 49, at 102. See also DIMSDALE, supra note 42, at 201-04;
BIRNEY, supra note 43, at 309-19. He eventually moved to the Virginia City, Mon-
tana area, where he lived with his wife. When in town, Slade often drank to excess,
occasionally riding his horse into a store or up and down the street firing off his
revolver. See Callaway, supra note 49, at 102-03; DIMSDALE, supra note 42, at 196-
98. On March 8-9, 1864, Slade engaged in a lengthy drunk and engaged in a variety
of antisocial behavior in Virginia City, ranging from dumping a pail of milk onto a
milkman to threatening several men with his gun. See BIRNEY, supra note 43, at
329-30; CALLAWAY, supra note 49, at 104-05; DIMSDALE, supra note 42, at 197-98;
LANGFORD, supra note 42, at 286-87. He ignored several warnings from Vigilantes to
go home before there was more trouble. See BIRNEY, supra note 43, at 331-32;
CALLAWAY, supra note 49, at 106; DIMSDALE, supra note 42, at 198; LANGFORD, supra
note 42, at 287. After Slade challenged several Vigilantes directly, the group met and
decided to execute Slade. See CALLAWAY, supra note 49, at 106-07; DIMSDALE, supra
note 42, at 198-99; LANGFORD, supra note 42, at 287-88. "Save for this execution, the
Vigilantes of Montana have been well-nigh universally commended. For this act they
have been fiercely condemned and as vigorously commended." CALLAWAY, supra note
49, at 109. Dimsdale took the part of the Vigilantes, summing up their work by
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Chance contributed to the success of the Vigilantes. The
mutual discovery of a large number of Masons in Bannack gave
the group a nucleus around which to organize." The Vigilantes
were also fortunate to have some remarkable men as leaders,
such as Wilbur F. Sanders, Nathaniel Langford, and X. Biedler.
However, the Montana Vigilantes needed more than the
good fortune of a nucleus of Masons and natural leaders upon
which to build their organization. The Vigilantes succeeded in
Montana because they fought to protect well-defined rights that
met the population's expectations of a just system of rights, in-
cluding private property rights. Faced with the enormity of the
road agents' assault on the community, overcoming the free rider
problem became easier for the Vigilantes. As Langford describes,
"The people bore with crime until punishment became a duty
and neglect a crime."53 Moreover, because the rights the Vigi-
lantes defended were widely accepted rights, they were able to
rally public support for their efforts.
A great deal of the Vigilantes' success came from their orga-
nizational structure. Although they made some attempts at se-
crecy, the membership of Montana Vigilantes was widely known
at the time. Their public commitment to the effort ensured their
continued participation because each member was aware that
the road agents would take revenge on any individual involved.
The process of making public decisions about hanging individual
road agents, for example, prompted reinforced commitment by
identifying the targets of potential revenge.
saying "there is nothing on their record for which an apology is either necessary or
expedient." DIMSDALE, supra note 42, at 267; see BIRNEY, supra note 43, at 223.
(Slade is a "possible exception" to the idea that Vigilantes hanged only men who had
.earned every inch of the rope").
52. Brought together after the "first natural death" in the area when the dying
man signaled his desire for a Masonic funeral, the Masons were surprised at the size
of the group which gathered. See LANGFORD, supra note 42, at 112-13. Dimsdale does
not mention the Masonic connection, although he was a Mason, perhaps because he
was and did not want to reveal information about the group so soon after its activi-
ties. JAMES M. HAMILTON, HISTORY OF MONTANA: FROM WILDERNESS TO STATEHOOD
513 (Merrill G. Burlingame ed., 1957). Birney notes that Dimsdale "refrains sedulous-
ly from mentioning more than one or two names" and suspected him of "being delib-
erately inaccurate as to dates." BIRNEY, supra note 43, at 11-12. Not only did the
Masons discover each other but the road agents discovered in the Masons, in
Langford's words, "an association . . . that would stand by and protect all its mem-
bers in the hour of danger." LANGFORD, supra note 42, at 113. The road agents left
the Masons alone: "Of the one hundred and two persons murdered by Henry
Plummer's gang, not one was a Mason." Id.
53. LANGFORD, supra note 42, at 9.
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c. Lessons from History
Just as vigilante organizations were a prominent feature of
the nineteenth century American West, the Militias are becom-
ing a common feature of the twentieth century, and perhaps the
twenty-first. Militia behavior significantly parallels that of the
Vigilantes. For example, the Vigilantes' behavior was set by
groups of private citizens who "took the law into their own
hands" and administered their own form of justice in hundreds of
instances.' The Vigilantes' records are mixed. Some vigilance
committees, like Montana's 1863-64 committee, came about in
response to serious problems and were largely successful in solv-
ing problems without injuring innocent people. Others, like the
Johnson County, Wyoming "Invaders" of 1892 described below,
were essentially terrorist gangs.
The experience of the vigilance committees is relevant for
the Militias in two ways. First, the vigilance committees' mixed
historical images mirror the dueling images of the Militias today.
The "good" vigilantes, like Montana's, embody a tradition of
private action to resolve structural imbalances, while the "bad"
vigilantes, like the Invaders, represent an alternative tradition of
terror which the Militias must avoid. In the public mind, the
Militias' placement within these traditions will have an impor-
tant impact on their influence today, regardless of the actual
character of their actions. Second, the "good" vigilantes differ
from the "bad" vigilantes in ways other than their goals. Move-
ments like the Montana Vigilantes were decentralized responses
to broad societal problems. Their actions, although violent, were
rooted in an ideological justification which involved limits on the
scope of their actions. Groups like the Johnson County Invaders,
on the other hand, merely used terror to rob others. Their very
methods reveal their lack of moral legitimacy, because their
actions required both hired gunmen and a national press cam-
paign. These differences suggest ways in which the Militias can
act to enhance their chances of success in overcoming free rider
problems.
Vigilantism had three main ideological elements which dis-
tinguished it from mob violence: self-preservation, popular sover-
eignty, and the right of revolution.55 Actions of self-preservation
54. Richard Maxwell Brown, Violence, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERI-
CAN WEST 393, 395-96 (Clyde A. Milner II et al. eds., 1994).
55. See id. at 395. Like the Militias, vigilantism was not an organized move-
ment on a national scale. See id. There are, however, sufficient similarities among
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can be justified only when a threat is actually present. Popular
sovereignty allows extra-legal action but requires appeal to a
broad enough section of the public to sustain it. Finally, the right
of revolution can be invoked to justify action against tyranny,
but revolutions that fail usually carry a heavy price for the un-
successful revolutionaries. All three elements are present to
varying degrees within the modem Militia movement. These
elements limited the scope of the vigilantes' actions, although not
always successfully.
The Montana Vigilantes justified their actions in terms of
self-preservation. Thomas Dimsdale, for example, a sympathetic
contemporary of the Montana Vigilantes, called for the Vigilan-
tes "to stand ready to back the law; and to bulwark the Territory
against all disturbers of its peace, when too strong for legal re-
pression, and when it fails or is unable to meet the emergency of
the hour."5 1 Similarly, Militias today consistently cite self-
preservation as a motive for their organization.57 While the va-
lidity of Militia members' fears is debatable, there is no doubt
that the State's killings in Waco and Ruby Ridge have deeply
frightened many Americans.
Popular sovereignty plays an important role for both groups
as well. Again, Dimsdale is explicit:
Peace and justice we must have, and it is what the citizens will
have in this community; through the courts, if possible; but
peace and justice are rights, and courts are only means to an
end, admittedly the very best and most desirable means; and if
they fail, the people, the republic that created them, can do
their work for them.58
Dimsdale's statements would not appear out of character in
many Militias' statements of purpose.59 For example, the Militia
of Montana argues:
the various vigilante groups that it is fair to describe an ideology of vigilantism. See
id.
56. DIMSDALE, supra note 42, at 266.
57. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 36 (statement of Norman Olson, Michigan
Militia) (stating that Militias are the "primary defense" of nation).
58. See DIMSDALE, supra note 42, at 266-67.
59. See JAMES RIDGEWAY, BLOOD IN THE FACE 12 (1995 ed.) Ridgeway writes:
In [Militia members'] view, the right of the people to own weapons and
organize themselves into private militias should be exercised not only to
defend the security of the state, but to defend the security of individuals
against a federal government bent upon destroying their freedom and even
their lives.
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[W]hen the codes and statutes are unjust for the majority of the
people, the people will rightly revolt and the government will
have to acquiesce without a shot being fired, because the mili-
tia stands vigilant in carrying out the will of the people in
defense of rights, liberty, and freedom.
The purpose of government is in the protection of the
rights of the people, when it does not accomplish this, the mili-
tia is the crusader who steps forward, and upon it rests the
mantle of the rights of the people.'
Finally, Militias explicitly seek to link themselves to the
right of revolution. For example, the Militia of Montana's hand-
book argues:
To balance the military power of the nation with the might of
the militia will put at odds any scheme by government officials
to use the force of government against the people. Therefore,
when the codes and statutes are unjust for the majority of the
people, the people will rightly revolt and the government will
have to acquiesce without a shot being fired, because the mili-
tia stands vigilant in carrying out the will of the people in
defense of rights, liberty and freedom.6
The ideological elements of both the Vigilantes and the
Militias are a response to each groups' perceptions of a weakened
government. In turn, the weakening of government is a reflection
of the inadequacy of authoritarian law solutions.6 2 Robert
Putnam captured the transition from a society with resilient so-
cial capital built of voluntary organizations to one without by
noting that Americans now largely bowl alone rather than in
60. See KENNETH S. STERN, A FORCE UPON THE PLAIN: THE AMERICAN MILITIA
MOVEMENT AND THE POLITICS OF HATE 76 (1996) (quoting the Militia of Montana).
61. See Militia of Montana (visited Feb. 13, 1997) <httpJ/www.nidlink.com/
-bobhard/mom.html> (on file with the Montana Law Review).
62. Some Militias see this weakness as manifest in an inability to prevent a
coming collapse of authority. For example, the Pennsylvania Citizen's Militia Manual
advises members that:
the biggest threat is not the Federal Government, but the teeming multi-
tudes of displaced civilians that will move across the land when the cities
begin burning .... Your militia will be a safe haven for thousands who are
running from the carnage in the cities when the collapse of the Federal
Government system occurs.
Pennsylvania Citizen's Militia Manual (visited Mar. 6, 1995) <http'//www.users.
fast.net/-klh/pa.patriot/manual.html> (on file with the Montana Law Review). The
long decline of urban America since World War II, despite repeated government pro-
grams aimed at reversing it, reinforces such views.
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leagues.6" Putnam explained how this captures our social prob-
lems in a recent interview:
Well, let's take the toughest case, which is my claim, partly but
not entirely tongue-in-cheek, that the fate of the republic hangs
on the fact that Americans are no longer engaging in league
bowling.
First, when you participate in a bowling league, interact-
ing regularly with the same people week after week, you learn
and practice what de Tocqueville called "habits of hearts." You
learn the personal virtues and skills that are the prerequisites
for a democracy. Listening, for example. Taking notes. Keeping
minutes. Taking responsibility for your views. That's what is
different about league bowling versus bowling alone.
Second, bowling leagues... and sports clubs and town
bands, whatever... provide settings in which people can talk
about their shared interests. These are settings quite different
from, say, a talk show, where Ted from Toledo calls in and
shares his prejudices with a nationwide audience. In that sce-
nario, the rest of us don't know Ted, we don't know how to
interpret what he says. But if Ted were in my bowling league,
I'd understand him better, because I would interact with him
regularly, and so I'd hold him accountable for his views."
Without the public's possession of the virtues and skills devel-
oped from such participation, government is weakened because it
becomes ever more like the model of competing interests used by
public choice theorists. The more accurately the public choice
model describes a government, the weaker government becomes
because it loses its moral legitimacy.65 The rise of the Militias is
partly a response to this social decay.
Weak governments produce a vacuum which private organi-
zations may fill. As I argued earlier, this may be a generally
desirable development, because the customary legal institutions
that arise in these circumstances are often superior to their
authoritarian law alternatives. To the extent that Militias play a
role akin to Putnam's bowling leagues, their contributions ought
to be valued. The key difference between Militias and nineteenth
century vigilantes, however, is the Militias failure, thus far, to
identify widely accepted rights for which they can offer plausible
63. See Putnam, supra note 31, at 70.
64. 'Bowling Alone:" An Interview With Robert Putnam About America's Collaps-
ing Civic Life (visited Sept. 6, 1996) <httpJ/muse.jhu.edu/demo/journal of democracy/
v006/putnam.interview.html> (on file with the Montana Law Review).
65. See discussion of rent-seeking supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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protection. Montana's Vigilantes are seen as heroes because they
risked their own lives to protect widely accepted rights to life
and property. The opening of our economy today, however, has
produced winners as well as losers, and the violated "rights" of
the losers are not nearly as widely accepted.
2. Too Far Away
Government is distant when it makes decisions at the state,
national, or even international level rather than at the local
level. Complaints about this distance are thus often expressed as
a preference for returning decision-making power to the local
and state levels.
a. The Militias
Problems resulting from the shift of government away from
the local level are one of the recurring themes of the Militia
movement. For example, Norman Olson, founder of the Michigan
Militia, voiced a typical Militia sentiment when he argued:
When you turn over state law to federal law, you also turn over
the power to enforce that law. You give up your sovereignty
and get more and more intrusion by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, the Bureau of Forestry and other government
agencies. We are gradually losing our state sovereignty."
The shift of decision-making authority farther away from local
communities produces what Militia critic Morris Dees describes
as "[t]he fear of, and anger at, a government that is insensitive,
uncaring and callous to the needs of its people."s" Many of the
Militias' complaints concern "signs that the federal government
is increasingly imposing its will on the population-for example,
in areas of the environment, education, and in some cases, ,abor-
tion." s The increasing shift of decisions away from federal
agencies with a significant local presence, like the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture, to those without much of a domestic pres-
66. DEES & CORCORAN, supra note 5, at 84-85 (1996). See LEVIN, supra note 37,
at 41 (increasing federal action since the New Deal behind Militias' view that there
is too much government).
67. Wayne Laugesen, Terrorism From Within: Colorado Birthplace of Radical
Groups (visited Feb. 13, 1997) <http'/www.boulderweekly.com/040496/cover.html> (on
file with the Montana Law Review) (quoting Dees).
68. HALPERN, supra note 30, at 12; see id. at 31 (characterizing Militias' views
of environmental regulations as "one more aspect of a runaway federal train destined
for totalitarian rule").
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ence outside Washington, like the Office of the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative, intensifies this effect.
69
There are many reasons decisions are moving to more dis-
tant levels of government. Making a decision locally is no guar-
antee that it is a good decision, of course," and decisions may
be shifted to the national level precisely to remove them from
local pressure and to ensure consideration of national interests.
Forcing state officials to stop de jure segregation, for example,
required national action.71 A related cause of the increased dis-
tance is the shift away from a closed, protected economy to an
open economy. As trade barriers fall, the impact of world eco-
nomic forces change domestic policies. Another reason for the
shift away from local decision-making is the government's at-
tempt to deal with what is at least perceived generally to be
large scale common problems: Controlling the emission of ozone
depleting chemicals, for example, requires national or even inter-
national action."2 Although the foregoing may be reasons to
move away from local decision-making, there are important rea-
sons to take the Militias' complaints seriously.
First, the increasing distance of government decision-makers
from individuals reduces accountability. When a local official
makes a decision, she confronts its effect on her neighbors direct-
ly; even state officials are rarely more than a day's drive from
those affected by their decisions. Federal officials, on the other
hand, are often far from those whose lives they affect, and the
scale of their decisions tends to dwarf individuals. However, this
government distance is more than physical. As Robert Higgs
pointed out, governments have an incentive to adopt means of
69. There are countervailing tendencies as well-modern communications, for
example, may make physically distant decision-makers easier to reach. These ten-
dencies do not, however, eliminate the problem of a lack of connection that comes
from physical distance: a decision-maker who lives in my town is part of my com-
munity; one who lives in Washington, D.C. is much less likely to be part of my com-
munity.
70. See generally CLINT BOLICK, GRASSROOTS TYRANNY: THE LIMITS OF FEDERAL-
ISM (1993) (describing causes of power and violations of individual rights by local
governments).
71. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 91-129 (1992).
72. Because environmental problems are likely to fall into this category, envi-
ronmental regulation has sparked considerable hostility from some Militia groups. See
supra note 68 and accompanying text; Dan Yurman, Blood Oaths and Fish Stories
Swim in Political Waters (visited January 13, 1996), gopher'//gopher.igc.apc.org
:70/00/environment/forests/wisdom.lands/ libraryl5l (collecting articles describing mili-
tia groups' opposition to environmental legislation) (on file with the Montana Law
Review).
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carrying out policies which conceal the policies' true costs. 73 As
government action becomes more complex and indirect, it also
becomes more distant from individuals: paying a five percent
sales tax on a purchase is an obvious cost of government while
paying a five percent higher price because of unknown mandates
on the manufacturer is not.
Second, government becomes farther away as it increasingly
relies upon authoritarian law solutions which restrict the oppor-
tunities for participation in both government and the econo-
my. 74 Such solutions tend to be imposed from higher levels of
government, in part because they are often prompted by con-
cerns that lower levels of government and the market have
"failed" to resolve a problem. Authoritarian law solutions also
tend to be imposed from higher, more distant levels of govern-
ment because the problems many such solutions are intended to
solve involve protection of interests of individuals who are locat-
ed far from the area where the decision is implemented. 5
73. Creating a wedge between perceived costs and actual costs can be done in a
number of ways: fiscal illusion, substitution of a command economy for a market
economy, adoption of indirect means of regulation like tax incentives, and mandating
compliance with costly regulations without compensation. See HIGGS, supra note 15,
at 65, 28-29. There are moral or efficiency arguments about whether, for example, a
polluter should be compensated for the costs of treating wastes discharged into Lake
Erie or simply told to treat the wastes. Compensating the polluter for the costs of
compliance with payments out of tax revenues would make the cost of the policy
clearer than shifting the costs to consumers through increased prices. See id. at 64-
65.
74. In his discussion of the application of the frontier myth in the early 20th
century to the exercise of American power in Asia, Richard Slotkin describes how
"the new frontier" of imperial rule in Asia was an incomplete substitute for the origi-
nal frontier. The shift signaled "the final abandonment of the democratic political
principles that had been so prominent a feature of the original frontier . . . [which]
appears most strikingly in [Theodore] Roosevelt's sarcastic dismissal of 'liberty' and
'consent of the governed' as concepts applicable in the contemporary situation." RICH-
AR SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION 53 (1992). More importantly, however, it revealed:
an equally undemocratic assertion of class privilege is implicit in Roosevelt's
polemic and in the policies he supported. For the new imperial frontier
could not, by definition, be a recreation of the old egalitarian frontier of
Boone and Crockett. The opportunities for advancement it offered could only
be seized by those with capital to invest, or with the skills and training to
act as proconsuls managing the affairs and ruling the destinies of an alien
population. These elites act as surrogates for the mass of the American
public, who can only participate vicariously in the new frontier.
Id. The substitution of vicarious participation for actual participation extends far
beyond the American occupation of the Philippines. What else but vicarious participa-
tion is offered the citizen who can watch C-SPAN but not influence his or her con-
gressional representatives? Or to the middle-aged manufacturing worker whose job is
eliminated due to the political rent-seeking which we incorrectly call "free trade?"
75. Thirty years ago, for example, timber harvests on public lands in the West
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Perhaps most importantly, the increased distance between
governed and government leads to increased disconnection be-
tween citizen and government. Particularly in rural areas and
small towns, politics is centered around personal relationships
between officials and the electorate. People often have-and
use-the home phone numbers of their elected officials. The
national government, by contrast, is largely becoming the prov-
ince of professional political operatives, lobbyists, and those who
control large amounts of money.7" Politicians sell "access" and
spend their time raising money rather than interacting with
ordinary constituents. In these circumstances, individual disen-
franchisement is quite real.
b. Historical precedent
The discovery of gold in California in 1848 sparked the be-
ginning of several decades of placer77 mineral rushes through-
out the American West.78 In California, Alaska, Colorado, Dako-
were the concern of the local logging industry. Today, Japanese industries seeking
raw materials compete with Eastern environmentalists, competing groups of public
land managers, and multinational logging concerns to control timber resources. Local
interests must share these resources with people they have never met. Even though
formal title to Western public lands has not changed, local interests which previously
had unchallenged de facto rights to the control of that land are now being
challenged.
Not only have individuals lost the de facto control they once exerted, but the
battle for control is now fought in unfamiliar terrain. Instead of bureaucratic alloca-
tion of land use rights, generally based upon customary allocations associated with
land ownership of nonpublic lands, those who seek to assert control over these lands
find themselves battling in courts over the habitats of species they did not know ex-
isted and in Washington over the details of legislation like the Endangered Species
Act. Thus, not only are individuals often confronted with disputes over control of
what they have historically regarded as theirs, even if they lacked title, even the
terms and location of the debate are intellectually and physically distant from their
lives.
76. See, e.g., Fred Wertheimer, The Dirtiest Election Ever, WASHINGTON POST,
Nov. 3, 1996, at C1 (stating that the 1996 election "will go down as worst in modern
times" with respect to campaign contributions; "the most powerful people in the coun-
try have proved in the 1996 political season that they do not believe the law applies
to them").
77. "Placer gold" is gold which has been eroded from rock and deposited on
sandbars, in gravel banks, or holes in streambeds. See RODMAN W. PAUL, MINING
FRONTIERS OF THE FAR WEST 1848-1880 6 (1963). "[In most cases it is manifestly
easier to extract gold from placers than from veins or replacement deposits." Id.
78. For a more detailed discussion of the mining camps in this context, see
Andrew P. Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes, & Cattlemen: Overcoming the Free Rider
Problem in the Private Provision of Law (1997) (work in progress on file with the au-
thor). In the interests of limiting the size of the footnotes in this section, I will rely
on examples from the California, Montana, and Black Hills (Dakota Territory) placer
1997] PRIVATE ACTORS 139
ta, Idaho, Montana, and Nevada, tens of thousands of placer
miners literally rushed into empty, remote areas' to claim min-
eral wealth. As they did so, the miners created their own institu-
tions for defining and assigning property rights, preventing and
punishing crime, and resolving disputes.
At the time that the miners established their communities,
the State was physically too far away. Government made deci-
sions thousands of miles from the mining camps and communica-
tions were, at best, slow and unreliable. Moreover, because con-
ditions in the early mining camps were unlike anything the
American State had previously confronted, legislators viewed
miners' problems through a lens distorted by Eastern issues.0
In Montana, the political differences between the federally ap-
pointed officials and the population they sought to rule exacer-
bated this distortion: "Thousands of the prospectors who
streamed into the Alder Gulch-Virginia diggings were either
actively hostile to federalism or indifferent, and they had nothing
rushes. The classic references on mining camps are JOHN R. UMBECI, A THEORY OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS (1981) and CHARLES HOwARD SHINN, LAND LAWS OF MINING DIS-
TRICTS (John Hopkins University 1884).
79. In Rodman Paul's words, "A more unpromising region for rapid settlement
could hardly be conceived." RODMAN W. PAUL, THE FAR WEST AND THE GREAT
PLAINS IN TRANSITION 1859-1900 24 (1988).
California was a remote, sparsely populated and obscure Mexican province that
had just become part of the United States when news of the discovery of gold
reached "the States" in 1848. Reachable from the east coast only by a cross-continen-
tal trek, a combined sea-land route across Panama, or an all water route through
the Straits of Magellan, it had "an ox-cart economy based on hides and tallow" be-
fore the influx of miners. See J.S. HOLLIDAY, THE WORLD RUSHED IN 26 (1981).
The first major placer rush in Montana was in the summer of 1862 on
Grasshopper Creek (Bannack), the second was at Alder Gulch (Virginia City) in the
spring of 1863, and the third at Last Chance Gulch (Helena) in July 1864. All three
occurred in areas which were virtually empty of population and economic infrastruc-
ture. The Montana rushes were less isolated than the earlier California rushes, since
steamers could bring supplies within 200 miles of Bannack and regular stage runs
were soon established to Utah. See DAVID DARY, ENTREPRENEURS OF THE OLD WEST
190 (1986). Isolation was relative, of course, and Salt Lake City was 475 miles away.
See BIRNEY, supra note 43, at 46-47; LANGFORD, supra note 42, at 142.
The Black Hills rush in 1874-79 occurred in an area almost as remote as the
California mining regions had been. The center of mining activity, Deadwood Creek,
was 240 miles from the nearest railroad and a week's stage ride from the territorial
capitol in Yankton. See T. H. WATKINS, GOLD AND SILVER IN THE WEST 115 (1971).
80. One of the best examples of this is the delay in organizing a civilian gov-
ernment for California due to national disputes over slavery. While tens of thousands
of miners and others headed for California in 1849, Congress adjourned without
organizing a territorial government because it could not agree on whether California
would permit slavery. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. This debate ignored
the reality that, in gold rush California, slavery was simply impracticable.
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to say about it.""' The distance was thus both physical and in-
tellectual.
Frequently the only representatives of the government avail-
able to the miners were military posts, but these were unable or
unwilling to provide law. For example, troops rarely left forts in
gold rush California because the military authorities were too
fearful of troop desertions to risk exerting their authority in the
gold fields.s2 No civil authority existed in California in 1849 be-
cause Congress could not agree on whether California would be a
free or slave territory. 3 When the lack of clear legal authority
combined with the legal chaos produced by the need to integrate
Mexican land titles into an American-style legal system, miners
in California were forced to develop their own solutions.' Simi-
larly, miners in Montana,5 the Black Hills" and elsewhere
81. HOWARD, supra note 1, at 41.
82. Commodore Thomas A. Catesby Jones reported to the Secretary of the Navy
in 1848:
For the present, and I fear for years to come, it will be impossible for the
United States to maintain any naval or military establishment in California,
as at the present no hope of reward or fear of punishment is sufficient to
make binding any contract between man and man upon the soil of Califor-
nia. To send troops out here would be needless, for they would immediately
desert.
HOLLIDAY, supra note 79, at 35-36. See also UMBECK, supra note 78, at 4 (U.S. mili-
tary force in California reduced by desertion to about 600 men); WATSON PARKER,
GOLD IN THE BLACK HILLS 70 (1966) ("soldiers compared their meager wages with
the golden hopes which mining offered and deserted in droves"); EDWARD LAZARUS,
BLACK HILLS, WHITE JUSTICE 79 (1991) ("A number of soldiers deserted Fort Abra-
ham Lincoln to try their hands at prospecting.").
83. See WILLIAM HENRY ELLISON, A SELF-GOVERNING DOMINION: CALIFORNIA,
1849-1860 17 (1950).
84. The United States was obligated to recognize legitimate Mexican land
grants under the Treaty of Guadelupe Hidalgo. Distinguishing valid from invalid
grants proved difficult and led to extensive litigation. (For a general description of
the problems of Mexican land titles, see DOYCE B. NUNIS, Historical Introduction to
JAMES R. MARSHALL & EDWARD J. BUFFIN, FROM MEXICAN DAYS TO THE GOLD RUSH
xxxi-lviii (1993)). See ELLISON, supra note 83, at 12. Because the Mexican land titles
were in Spanish, in documents frequently missing from California, and based on a
civilian property law scheme, Americans found them difficult to decipher. Moreover,
because Mexican mining law required costly and time-consuming steps to gain title,
not many mineral grant holders had completed all the steps. As a result, few Mexi-
can mineral land grants were upheld after the United States took control of Cali-
fornia. See UMBECK, supra note 78, at 68-69.
85. Montana Territory had not yet been organized when gold was found in
southwestern Montana, and the gold rush area was still part of Idaho Territory
(which itself was organized out of Washington Territory only in 1863). An early ob-
server noted that there was only one copy of the Idaho Territorial Statutes in all of
present day Montana when Montana Territory was created. See Jesse B. Roote, The
Courts and Lawyers of Montana, in I HELEN F. SANDERS, A HISTORY OF MONTANA
579, 582 (1913).
86. The gold rush in the Black Hills began before the Hills were "ceded" by the
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faced conditions in which government was simply not present.
The social capital of the mining camps was thus even less
than our present, severely eroded stock:
In a world of strangers, in a place without evidence of govern-
ment, religion or law, goldseekers felt free to grasp for fortune.
Like soldiers in a foreign land, it would be easy for many of
them to slough off the social codes and moral precepts that had
been enforced by family, friends and the influence of the
church.8"
Because the placer mineral rushes occurred in remote locations
and because of the sudden population surges which followed
discovery of gold, miners had to develop institutions together
with thousands of neighbors with whom they had little or no
previous contact.88 As most miners did not plan to settle in the
gold fields but only wanted to get rich and return to "the
States,"" miners had to contend with a future which cast barely
any shadow over the present. Miners' interest in investing in so-
cial capital was therefore extremely low.
Miners needed social institutions to secure possession of
potentially valuable claims to mining rights ° and to protect
their gold, hard-to-replace equipment, and supplies.9 Mining
Sioux and the presence of miners there was technically illegal. Although by 1875 the
military was frequently looking the other way when it discovered miners in the Hills
(the Sioux were not as accommodating), miners had no rights cognizable in a formal
legal system. See PARKER, supra note 82, at 71. Confronted with this problem later,
the Dakota Territorial Supreme Court decided that first appropriators' rights could be
enforced against later appropriators, even if they were themselves technically invalid.
See id. at 188.
87. See HOLLIDAY, supra note 79, at 300.
88. California attracted 400 settlers in 1848, 90,000 in 1849, and grew to a
total population of over 220,000 by the end of 1852. See HOLLIDAY, supra note 79, at
26; see also WATKINS, supra note 79, at 40. The area around Virginia City in Mon-
tana grew from empty to over 10,000 in a matter of months. See LANGFORD, supra
note 42, at 137. The Black Hills went from virtually no permanent population before
they were taken from the Sioux to over 15,000 by December 1875, more than had
lived in the entire Dakota Territory in 1870. See HOWARDS ROBERT LAMAR, DAKOTA
TERRITORY 1861-1889 148, 150 (1956).
89. LANGFORD, supra note 42, at 42 ("There is nothing permanent in the life of
a gold miner-and beyond the moment, nothing strong or abiding in his associa-
tions."); see also HOLLIDAY, supra note 79, at 356 (for miners, "the return home was
the pressing purpose of all their work").
90. Claims were often quite valuable. A California '49er noted in his diary be-
ing offered (and declining) $10,000 for a claim in 1851. See THE DIARY OF A FORTY-
NINER 40 (Chauncey L. Canfield, ed. 1906).
91. Because most mining districts were located far from established centers of
supplies, prices of food and mining equipment were high. See WATKINS, supra note
79, at 37. "No characteristic of gold rush California is so well known as the astro-
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institutions needed to be flexible due to the rapidly changing
mining technology.2 The solutions had to economize on miners'
time in participation because the opportunity cost of participat-
ing in governance was time lost in the mines. Losing time in the
mines meant that miners sacrificed not only the gold they would
find but possibly meant they would miss the big strike the min-
ers all hoped they would make." Finally, the solutions had to
be acceptable not only to those miners present when the solution
was adopted, but also to the thousands of newcomers who would
arrive in coming weeks and would soon outnumber the existing
population. 4
The miners successfully developed their own customary law
solutions. Although there were differences which reflected local
conditions, miners' law was remarkably uniform in several re-
spects. First, the miners established a new principle of mineral
ownership which separated the mineral rights from the surface
rights and awarded the mineral rights to the finder. Second,
nomical prices at which everything seemed to sell." JOSEPH R. CONLIN, BACON,
BEANS, AND GALANTINES 90 (1986).
92. Technological change required constant increases in the size of claims. Early
placer claims were mined with simple methods such as panning. When panning, a
relatively inefficient technique, no longer was profitable, miners began using sluices
and other somewhat more advanced equipment. Relatively quickly, however, most
placer claims were worked out (by 1852 in California and 1876 in the Black Hills),
and miners turned to more capital intensive techniques, such as hydraulic engi-
neering. This method used vast amounts of water under high pressure to wash tons
of sand, gravel, and gold off hillsides into massive sluices. See OTIS E. YOUNG, JR.,
WESTERN MINING 127-29 (1970). Each change in technology changed the optimal
claim size and led to regular readjustment of mining district rules governing claim
size.
Technological change also necessitated regular development of new property
rights to water and timber. As mining technology evolved to require ever-increasing
amounts of water, access to water became increasingly important. Water supply dif-
fered significantly between mining areas; in California, for example, the northern
mining areas had abundant water year-round, while the southern areas lacked water
for much of the summer. See HOLLIDAY, supra note 79, at 304. Timber became im-
portant for constructing sluices and water delivery systems.
93. See HOLLIDAY, supra note 79, at 297 ("Miners shared an indifference toward
California and its future"); see also LANGFORD, supra note 42, at 107-08.
94. The only record of difficulty between newcomers and first appropriators I
have found despite extensive searching are two descriptions of a dispute in the Black
Hills and one in California. In the Black Hills, claims were established larger than
the traditional claim (300 feet in length), and the narrowness of the valleys made
ridge to ridge claims possible. Faced with newcomers' demands for division of claims,
the first appropriators successfully resisted. See PARKER, supra note 82, at 61;
GREEVER, supra note 43, at 303 (1963). In the California dispute, the newcomers out-
numbered the original group and voted to reduce the claim size, allowing choice of
claims in the order of arrival. See UMBECK, supra note 78, at 93-94.
95. See UMBECK, supra note 78, at 69-73; SHINN, supra note 78, at 9. Prior to
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the miners established a mechanism for recording and maintain-
ing claims.96 Third, the miners established a private adjudicato-
ry system which resolved disputes.97 Fourth, the miners created
rules of conduct which forbade and successfully deterred" tort-
based crimes (e.g., theft, assault, murder) but that did not in-
clude non-tort based crimes (e.g., prostitution, weapons posses-
sion, political crimes) and which relied on a limited set of sanc-
tions."
the California gold rush, the United States had generally followed the European
model of mineral rights law, granting mineral rights to the State. See LAMAR, supra
note 88, at 158; UMBECK, supra note 78, at 4, 69-70.
96. Claimants were generally required to post notices and register claims with
an elected district recorder, who was authorized to charge a small fee for the service.
To maintain a claim typically required regular work on the claim. See JOHN D.
LESHY, THE MINING LAW 379-80 (1987) (outlining the typical rules); UMBECK, supra
note 78, at 92-96 (outlining the usual provisions); SHINN, supra note 78, at 11-12.
97. Langford gives a good general description of these "courts":
It is now the general custom among the property holders of a mining camp,
as a first step towards organization, to elect a president or judge, who is to
act as the judicial officer of the district. He has both civil and criminal
jurisdiction. All questions affecting the rights of property, and all infractions
of the peace, are tried before him. When complaint is made to him, it is
his duty to appoint the time and place of trial in written notices which
contain a brief statement of the matter in controversy, and are posted in
conspicuous places throughout the camp. The miners assemble in force to
attend the trial. The witnesses are examined, either by attorneys or by the
parties interested, and when the evidence is closed the judge states the
question at issue, desiring all in favor of the plaintiff to separate from the
crowd in attendance until they can be counted, or to signify by a vote of
"aye" their approval of his claim. The same forms are observed in the deci-
sion of a criminal case .... The court is composed of the entire population.
To guard against mistakes, the party in defect, in all cases, has the right
to demand a second vote.
LANGFORD, supra note 42, at 85. See also UMBECK, supra note 78, at 92-96; SHINN,
supra note 78, at 14-15, 31-33.
98. See UMBECK, supra note 78, at 87 ("little violence was reported" in Cali-
fornia mining districts); see SHINN, supra note 78, at 6 (noting continuing use of
mining districts in California in 1878-79), 38-39 (continued as long as "surface dig-
gings" lasted); see, e.g., HOLLIDAY, supra note 79, at 323 (quoting miner's letter:
December 26. The people here refrain from-from I hardly know what,
unless it is common, vulgar stealing. I think there is less of what is ordi-
narily called stealing here than any place I was ever in; and yet there can
be little difficulty in stealing to almost any extent. A vast amount of prop-
erty, easily movable, is daily and nightly exposed without a watch, or even
a lock.);
see also DIARY, supra note 90, at 51.
It is a queer thing how well we got along without any courts or law ...
Outside of a few cutting and shooting scrapes among the gamblers there
have been no serious crimes, and it is a fact that we are more orderly and
better behaved as a rule than the eastern towns from which we came.
Id.
99. Flogging, banishment, and hanging were the primary sanctions. See HAMIL-
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Miners' law continued for a time even after the arrival of the
State.' 0 Although the arrival of the government courts ulti-
mately meant the demise of the miners' informal legal institu-
tions, these institutions significantly influenced the authoritari-
an legal institutions which followed. Indeed, the success of the
government courts was due in part to their explicit recognition of
many of the rules created in the miners' courts. 10
c. Lessons from History
The miners' rapid creation of flexible, reasonably fair, and
sturdy institutions suggests that when the stakes are high
enough, individuals can overcome the free rider problems inher-
ent in the private provision of law. The success of the miners'
institutions in surviving the arrival of the State and influencing
authoritarian legal institutions also demonstrates that custom-
ary law institutions can have an impact even when the future
casts a vanishingly small shadow over the participants.
The miners' experience points to a principle for minimizing
the potential for a "ratcheting up" of authoritarian law: individ-
uals will not compete for control within the State when the costs
of doing so are too high. Because the miners' opportunity costs of
participating in government were so high, they had little interest
in "mining" the State. Only when the saturation of the mining
districts was sufficiently great to lower the opportunity costs did
it become worthwhile for individuals to compete for control of the
TON, supra note 52, at 221.
100. For example, the intersection of mining and competition for jurisdiction over
the mines gave Denver in 1860 four sets of courts. A newspaperman visiting Denver
at that time reported that the four sets of courts managed to operate together:
The miners' courts, the people's courts, and "provisional government" (a new
name for [the attempted territory of] 'Jefferson') divided jurisdiction in the
mountains; while Kansas and the provisional government ran concurrent in
Denver and the valley. Such as felt friendly to either jurisdiction patronized
it with their business. Appeals were taken from one to the other, papers
certified up or down and over, and recognized, criminals delivered and judg-
ments accepted from one court by another, with a happy informality which
it is pleasant to read of. And here we are confronted by an awkward fact:
there was undoubtedly much less crime in the two years this arrangement
lasted than in the two which followed the territorial organization and regu-
lar government.
J. H. BEADLE, WESTERN WILDS AND THE MEN WHO REDEEM THEM 477 (1877).
101. The first, post-1848 federal law on mining, passed in 1866, explicitly incor-
porated the customs and rules of mining camps. See LESHY, supra note 96, at 17;
PAUL, supra note 79, at 172-73. Federal, state, and territorial courts all relied heavi-
ly on mining district "laws." See SHINN, supra note 78, at 51.
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State. Known sites where large quantities of gold are available
to those with a pick or a pan are, of course, rare today. Paradoxi-
cally, some of the events which have brought economic distress
in the short run and prompted some of the Militias' discon-
tent-such as falling trade barriers-hold the promise of an
economy in which equivalent opportunities are more generally
available. As increased economic openness creates new economic
opportunities, the opportunity cost of "mining" the State will
again rise. As it does, the structural balance may shift back
toward customary law. To the extent these opportunities arise in
relatively unregulated areas (for example, the Internet), there is
an opportunity to evade State action. Rather than oppose mea-
sures such as trade liberalization, the Militias may more effec-
tively achieve their goal of a limited State by seeking even more
change in these areas.
Miners' courts consistently made three structural mistakes,
and these mistakes offer negative lessons for the Militias of
today. First, the miners' courts often failed to create objective
and unbiased decision-makers. By reserving trials to entire
camps, for example, decisions were too easily manipulated. 12
When miners did delegate, they sometimes failed to shield the
decision-makers from blatant physical threats.'"a The "common-
law court" movement, which often accompanies Militia activity,
seems particularly susceptible to this problem because of their
focus on delegitimizing State courts."°
The miners' second structural mistake was to define their
communities too narrowly. Remembering that their prejudices
were widely shared in nineteenth century America explains but
does not excuse the miners' racism against Chileans, Mexicans,
and especially the Chinese. 5 Nativism may have been a pow-
102. For example, tearful letters to mothers were read, and men sentenced to
hang were instead released. See, e.g., DIMSDALE, supra note 42, at 81-82. Friends of
the accused were allowed to pack meetings, vote repeatedly, and otherwise manipu-
late outcomes. See id. at 81.
103. HAMILTON, supra note 52, at 221 (stating that "[c]riminals preferred jury
trials, because their friends could, by threats, intimidate the jury but could not stam-
pede the whole community").
104. DEVIN BURGHART & ROBERT CRAWFORD, GUNS AND GAVELS 1-7 (1996) (de-
scribing common-law court movement and claiming a link to militias).
105. The narrowness of the mining community's self-definition went beyond race,
however. Placer miners saw themselves as a separate community, defined as atomis-
tic individuals each searching for his own big strike. As mining became more indus-
trial, placer miners were unsuccessful in joining together in unions. See RICHARD E.
LINGENFELTER, THE HARDROCK MINERS 105 (1974). More importantly for the survival
of the miners' courts, they were unsuccessful at convincing outside investors, needed
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erful organizing tool for miners-American gold for Americans
was a convenient slogan for putting together a group to dispos-
sess foreign miners from their claims-but it carried a high cost.
When mining shifted from placer mines to hard rock mines,
"American" miners found themselves at a significant disadvan-
tage to more experienced Cornish miners, cheaper Chinese min-
ers, and other groups." s Anti-foreigner sentiment significantly
impeded miners in pursuing class goals.1 7 "American" hard
rock miners had more in common with their Cornish and Chi-
nese colleagues than they did with the "American" mine owners
like George Hearst. Similarly, the Militias are often accused of
having connections to modern racist and anti-Semitic organiza-
tions. l 5 While many Militia organizations attempt to disavow
such sentiments, firmer steps to disassociate themselves from
such organizations are necessary if the Militias are to avoid the
miners' mistakes. 1°9
to provide the capital necessary for advanced mining technology, that there was an
alternative to extension of State courts and law. Some outsiders, of course, would
have preferred the State courts because they sought control of the courts themselves,
but others might have been open to alternatives built on the experience of the
miners' courts.
106. See id. at 5-6 (noting that the Chinese were paid less and the Cornish were
"the miner's miner").
107. Id. at 103 ("hostility toward the Cornish by Irish and American miners and
the community at large destroyed the solidarity among the miners").
108. See, e.g., Lance Williams & Scott Winokur, Militia Extremists Defend Their
Views (visited April 23, 1995) <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bir/examiner/ar ...
995&month-04&day-23&article-NEWS12487.dtl> (on file with the Montana Law Re-
view) (quoting Brian Levin of Kianwatch that "I believe there is a significant amount
of racism and anti-Semitism in these groups"); DEES & CORCORAN, supra note 5, at
87 ("the links between the [Militia] movement as a whole and the haters and racists
of America were strong").
109. The Montana Constitutional Militia, for example, includes in its list of its
adversaries "Members of Hate Groups" which it defines as the Klan and other hate
groups. Montana Constitutional Militia (visited Sept. 3, 1996) <http'/
www.constitution.org/mil/mt/mil_usmt.html> (on file with the Montana Law Review)
("Those who have committed crimes need to be brought to justice, and the others
counseled to try to redeem them as good citizens."). The Pennsylvania Citizen's Mili-
tia Manual counsels those interested in forming units to "[o]pen your militias to all
races, creeds, and religions." Pennsylvania Citizen's Militia Manual, supra note 62.
Similarly, the Michigan Militia Corps opens its Web page with the statement: "We
believe wholeheartedly in the values enshrined in the Constitution for the United
States of America, the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, and the Con-
stitution of Michigan, and the application of these values to ALL. If you do not
agree, please take your beliefs elsewhere." Michigan Militia Corps Resources (visited
Feb. 17, 1997) <http'// mmc.cns.net/michiganmilitia.html> (on file with the Montana
Law Review). The founder of the United States Militia Association (in Idaho) argues
that racists and anti-Semites have attempted to "jump on the bandwagon" but that
Militias have repeatedly told them to "get out of here." David Hoffman, America's
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The miners' third structural error was the short time hori-
zon under which they operated. Most miners, particularly in the
placer rushes, did not intend to remain in the gold fields any
longer than the few months they thought necessary to dig up
their fortune. Miners had little interest in events next year, or
even next month. That the miners were able to cooperate at all
in these conditions is remarkable. Because the future cast such a
short shadow, however, the private law structures miners built
were equally temporary. When faced with competition from men
who saw greater opportunity in "mining" government than in
mining gold, and who therefore had an interest in displacing the
miners' courts, the miners' courts disappeared.1 To create a
lasting presence, the Militias need to strive to lengthen the
future's shadow.
The increasing physical and intellectual distance of govern-
ment from the people partially explains the Militia's growth. The
Militias can learn valuable lessons from the miners' approach to
the same problem in the nineteenth century. The most important
lesson of the mining camps is that avoiding authoritarian law
requires better opportunities outside government. The transition
from a relatively closed economy to a more or less open one is
difficult, of course, but it is in the opportunities offered by a freer
market that freedom lies. The ability to shift transactions across
borders to avoid domestic legal restrictions will free Americans
escaping economic regulation as much as it frees those who wish
to avoid other societies' restrictions on political discourse.
Militias-Angry White Guys or Defenders of Liberty? (visited Sept. 4, 1996)
<http'J/www.webcom.com/-haight/backissues/7_95/white.html> (on file with the Mon-
tana Law Review). George and Wilcox also point out that it was a Militia group, the
Gadsden Minutemen, who exposed the "Good Old Boys Roundup" held annually by
law enforcement officers, including agents of the FBI and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms, at which signs such as "Nigger Check Point" and racist comments
were made. GEORGE & WILCOX, supra note 38, at 264.
Such disavowals, however, are not enough for their critics. An Anti-Defamation
League spokesperson, for example, argued that "[the militias aren't set up as racist
institutions, but that's where racists find a home." Wayne Laugesen, Terrorism From
Within: Colorado Birthplace of Radical Groups (visited April 4, 1996),
<http'/www.boulderweekly. com/040496/cover.html> (on file with the Montana Law
Review).
110. Most miners were, of course, anarcho-capitalists by experience rather than
by philosophy. They had no objection to the State legal system back home in "the
States." Their objection was that the State had neither the resources or the inclina-
tion to provide them with the means to get rich in the diggings. I am, therefore,
reluctant to be too critical of them for failing to build a classical liberal society in
the diggings.
1997]
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3. Too Large
Governments can undertake large projects and spend mas-
sive amounts of resources. Being "large" means more than this,
however. As Robert Higgs stated, "What distinguishes the capital
letter leviathan is the wide scope of its effective authority over
economic decision-making, that is, the great extent to which
government officials rather than private citizens effectively de-
cide how resources will be allocated, employed, and enjoyed.""'
Government becomes "too large" when its exercise of this much
authority over the allocation of resources crowds out customary
legal institutions with authoritarian law.
a. The Militias
The most common sign of structural imbalance cited by the
Militias is that government is too large in relation to individu-
als.' Ruby Ridge and Waco, which feature prominently in
most Militias' statements about the federal government,"' are
only the more extreme examples of the imbalance between indi-
viduals and the State. Militia critic Morris Dees summarizes this
type of complaint as "the fear of, and anger at, a government
that over-regulates, overtaxes and at times murders its own
citizens.""' The "too large" complaint expresses a preference for
voluntary solutions to public goods problems. 15
The belief that the government is "too large" is also connect-
111. HIGS, supra note 15, at 27-28.
112. Just exactly where the line between "too large" and "just right" lies is the
subject of much debate even within the Militia movement, although what is "too
large" includes what Militia members see as too many restrictions on gun ownership
and overly high tax rates. See GEORGE & WILCOX, supra note 38, at 249; RIDGEWAY,
supra note 59, at 16 (noting the natural alliance between militia leaders and the
attack on big government); HALPERN & LEVIN, supra note 5, at 2-3 (opposition to the
Brady Bill and assault weapon ban common to Militias). "Too large" also covers a
wide range of complaints that "the government has become increasingly involved in
every aspect of a normal person's life". Id. at 12. Looking at history, the Militias see
a past in which individuals' lives were relatively unencumbered by government con-
trols. See id. at 12-13.
113. See, e.g., HALPERN, supra note 30, at 2-3 (describing a common concern
among Militia groups over Ruby Ridge and Waco).
114. Laugesen, supra note 109 (quoting Dees).
115. Militia organizations almost uniformly cite assisting in national defense and
disaster relief as two of their aims, for example, and both are often considered public
goods. See, e.g., GEORGE & WILCOX, supra note 38, at 260 (quoting news report that
.organizers say emergency public service has long been part of the militia mission,
right up there with defending the Second Amendment and keeping an eye on the
government").
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ed to the Militias' view of the relationship between citizen and
State as a social contract.1 ' For Militias, the social contract is
the Constitution, read in the light of the other Founding
documents."7 Since many Militia groups cite prevention of
State tyranny as a (if not the) central feature of the American
social contract, attempts by the State to exercise powers not
included in that contract are not merely breaches of an agree-
ment, but a return to the tyranny from which we escaped in
1776."18
b. Historical Precedent
It might seem peculiar to think of government in the nine-
teenth century West as "too large." A comparison of the experi-
ences of the free range cattle industry in Wyoming and Montana
shows that government was too large as defined by Higgs. Wyo-
ming, Montana, and the western parts of the Dakotas developed
an extensive free range cattle industry during the 1870s and
1880s."' By the mid-1880s, the cattle kings dominated the
industry, particularly in Wyoming, where huge herds grazed
openly across public and private land alike, unrestricted by fenc-
es.12
0
116. In this view, the citizen exists as a rights bearing entity prior to the State
and the State receives only that which the citizen delegates to the State.
117. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 36 (statement of Norman Olson, Michigan
Militia).
118. The Pennsylvania Citizen's Militia Manual, for example, argues "the only
reason a civilian, or 'unorganized,' militia exists is in order to keep the government
in check in order that the government may remain in the hands of the people."
Pennsylvania Citizen's Militia Manual, supra note 62.
119. This section presents a concise summary of the free range cattle industry
and the conflicts between large cattle operations and smaller ranchers and farmers.
For a more complete analysis see Morriss, supra note 42.
120. By 1885-86, there were probably about 1.5 million cattle in Wyoming. See
T.A. LARSON, HISTORY OF WYOMING 167 (2d ed. 1978). Part of the financial attraction
of the free range cattle business was that thousands of cattle were routinely turned
out onto the range to fend for themselves in the winter at no cost to the owners.
See HELENA HUNTINGTON SMITH, THE WAR ON POWDER RIVER 34 (1966). No herd
management existed. See id. Ranchers did not feed herds, drive them to sheltered
spots, or segregate bulls to prevent winter calving. See id. Open range grazing was
necessary because cattle required 40 acres each in Wyoming, and the 160-acre units
available by homesteading were therefore useless for ranching. See LARSON, supra, at
177. Open range grazing also saved on costs: fences were unnecessary and labor re-
quirements were minimal during the winter. Id. at 177. Cowboys then rounded up
the cattle in the spring. Bad weather caused problems, however. 1886-87 was a terri-
ble year for the cattle business in Wyoming. See SMITH, supra, at 35-36. The sum-
mer of 1886 was a severe drought, "more cattle than ever before had been piled onto
the range" and still more cattle were being brought into Wyoming. See id. When the
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Three problems arose during the 1880s which reduced the
enormous profitability of the cattle kings' empires. First, the size
of the herds rapidly increased as ranchers shipped in thousands
of cattle to grow fat on the "free" grass.' Second, the range
was growing smaller and more crowded as homesteaders began
to take up claims and to run cattle of their own. 2' Third, the
attractions of the free range were drawing more small operators
into the cattle business, creating coordination and free rider
problems in the round-ups and allocation of unbranded cattle,
known as "mavericks."'m
The social institutions the cattle kings created were ade-
quate to regulate division of the public range by a small, rela-
tively homogeneous set of interests. When Wyoming was more or
less a large, unfenced, unpopulated field, the cattle kings were
able to settle disputes amicably amid the splendor of the Chey-
enne Club." They jointly managed round-ups and allocated
mavericks under the "law of accustomed range."'25 However,
these institutions were hopelessly inadequate to deal with the
severe winter hit, more than 90% of some herds died. See id. at 36-37. The result of
the combination of such things as bad weather, mismanagement, and overstocking
was "the most appalling mass slaughter of animals the West had ever seen or would
see again, second only to the slaughter of the buffalo." Id. at 38. The average loss in
Wyoming was probably about 50%. See id. at 46.
121. See LEWIS ATHERTON, THE CATTLE KINGS 165 (1961).
122. See SMITH supra note 120, at 25. The arrival of small stock raisers caused
new problems. "Soon the have-nots, the little fellows with fifty or a hundred or two
hundred head, were proposing their own rule of thumb to the effect that any man
who had cattle on the range was entitled to brand mavericks." Id. at 58.
123. Mavericks were calves which were missed during a roundup or which were
orphans. See id. at 51. They also included unbranded mature cattle. See id. at 52.
The huge roundups conducted each year contributed to the maverick problem because
the size and speed of the roundups meant cowboys missed more cattle, and so more
unbranded calves grew up on the range. See id. at 33-34.
Smith calls the problem of allocating mavericks "the most confused, embittered,
explosive question ever to bedevil the cattle range." Id. at 25. Under the "law of
accustomed range," a maverick belonged to whoever's range it was found upon. See
id. at 57. When ranchers cooperated in a joint round-up, they often divided the mav-
ericks in proportion to the relative herd sizes of the participants. See LARSON, supra
note 120, at 183.
124. Smith describes the Cheyenne Club as:
[T]hat wonderful institution . . . . No other cow-country capital had any-
thing like it. It boasted of having the best steward and the best chef of any
club in the United States . . . and servants imported from Ottawa where,
under the British flag, men were taught to be servants instead of retorting
curtly: "Do it yourself." when requested to shine a pair of shoes.
SMITH, supra note 120, at 12-13.
125. See id. at 57 (explaining that, according to the "law of accustomed range," a
maverick belonged to the man on whose land it was found).
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competing interests presented by a more heterogeneous society of
small holders, small cattle operations, and cattle kings. The solu-
tions to the maverick problem, for example, broke down as con-
trol of the range splintered and as individuals discovered means
of creating mavericks they could claim. On the open range, the
ease of searching a neighbor's land for untended cows or by driv-
ing off or killing a calf's mother meant that stronger solutions
were necessary. 28
Unlike Montana or the Dakotas, which had relatively di-
verse economies, the cattle industry dominated Wyoming eco-
nomically and politically and controlled the territorial and state
governments. 27 The cattle kings' first response to the growing
conflicts on the range was to use their control of the territorial
and state governments to impose solutions to the maverick prob-
lem. By using the power of the State, the cattle kings came close
to eliminating their competitors. Through the State and the
powers of the State to delegate to the Association, the cattle
kings prevented their employees from owning any cattle, seized
control of all mavericks, and restricted small holders' abilities to
sell their cattle."2 Helen Huntington Smith summed up the ef-
126. See id. at 54-55. Because small ranchers did not participate in the joint
roundups (being neither welcome nor anxious to contribute weeks of labor to round-
ing up others' cattle), most of the mavericks went to the large operations. See
LARSON, supra note 120, at 185.
127. For example, in 1890, 8 of 12 members of the upper house of the legisla-
ture, including all five members of the livestock committee, were members of the
Wyoming Stock Growers' Association. See SMITH, supra note 120, at 85. See generally
W. Turrentine Jackson, The Wyoming Stock Growers' Association Political Power in
Wyoming Territory, 1873-1890, 33 MiSS. VALLEY HIST. REV. (1947).
128. In 1884, the cattle kings' organization, the Wyoming Stock Growers' Associa-
tion, persuaded the Territorial legislature to pass the Maverick Law, which placed
full control over roundups in their hands and allocated all mavericks to the Associa-
tion. See 1884 Wyo. Sess. Laws 87; see also SMITH, supra note 120, at 59-60;
LARSON, supra note 120, at 184. "Small cattlemen who were not members of the
association despised the Maverick Law." Id. Neither Colorado nor Montana turned
control of the maverick issues over to the big cattle growers. See SMITH, supra note
120, at 59, 63 ("Not only was authority over livestock matters vested in the govern-
ment of the state or territory, instead of in a stock-growers' association, but the au-
thority was decentralized and democratic. There was no fuss over maverick sales
because they were left in local hands.").
In Smith's words, 'The maverick law of 1884 lit the powder train which led to
the Johnson County explosion." Id. at 59. The Maverick Law had a number of provi-
sions which assured mavericks would end up only in the herds of the cattle kings.
See id. at 60-63. First, all mavericks found were to be held on behalf of the Associa-
tion. See id. at 60. Second, no cattle were to be branded between February 15 and
the beginning of the spring roundup (approximately three months later), preventing
small holders from branding any cattle from their own herds which had strayed. See
id. at 61. Third, only those posting a bond of $3,000 to the Association could bid on
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fect of the Wyoming approach: "It was a system guaranteed to
make outlaws even out of angels, and there were very few angels
on Powder River."
129
The cattle kings believed there was widespread theft of their
cattle but that the courts were unreliable in punishing rustlers
because juries, the only part of the legal system the cattle kings
could not control, were made up of rustlers and their sympathiz-
ers.13 Failure to secure convictions led the Association's lead-
ers to "the dangerous conviction that everybody was out of step
but themselves-the press, the public, the juries, [and] the judg-
es .... "",' Convinced that only extra-legal action could resolve
the problem, the Wyoming cattlemen arranged an invasion of
Johnson County, a county of small holdings where they believed
rustlers held sway. In a military-style operation, a heavily armed
force of more than forty Wyoming cattlemen and hired Texas
gunmen literally invaded Johnson County, Wyoming in 1892
aboard a specially chartered train. 32 The "Invasion" ended in a
humiliating rescue of the Invaders by the U.S. Army's caval-
mavericks, which rarely sold for more than $10. See id. at 62. Finally, the funds
from sales were turned over to the Association for "the payment of cattle inspectors
and other like purposes." Id. at 60. The effect of the law was to prevent anyone
from purchasing a maverick except the cattle kings.
129. SMITH, supra note 120, at 113.
130. See LARSON, supra note 120, at 187-90. In 1888, the Secretary of the Asso-
ciation wrote:
while I would be sorry to see the return of the old days, when it was nec-
essary to defend your property at the expense of human life I am inclined
to believe that we shall come to this unless the community insist upon the
punishment of cattle thieves through the regular channels of the courts of
law.
Id. at 190 (quoting Thomas B. Adams). The cattle kings were right that jury sympa-
thy sometimes made it difficult to convict rustlers, although they exaggerated the
extent of the conviction problem: "Outside of periods when feeling ran high there
were convictions in cattle cases; while as for horse thieves, they were sent up time
and again. SMITH, supra note 120, at 71, 116 (detailing claims of acquittals). The
reason for this feeling was not that juries were made up of rustlers, however, but
that most settlers believed
that the Association operated on the principle of one rule for me and anoth-
er rule for thee. The average citizen believed that stock-law violations were
winked at when committed by a favored member, while the same 'mistake'
if made by an ordinary fellow would lead to his arrest.
Id. at 71.
Smith recounts a number of incidents in which prominent Association members vio-
lated the law with impunity. See id. at 71-75. A lack of credibility on the part of
Association's stock detectives among the general public also made convictions hard to
secure-one juror reportedly told a prosecutor after a trial that he would not convict
a dog on the basis of the testimony of such liars. See id. at 81.
131. SMITH, supra note 120, at 81.
132. See id. at 196.
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ry." If the Invaders' military leadership had not been so inept
the results might have been even more disastrous. 134
The Montana cattle kings took a different approach to the
problem of dividing the open range. They had to share control of
the territorial political apparatus with the mining interests of
the western part of the Territory and the farming interests.
Without the Wyoming cattle kings' complete political dominance,
Montana's cattle kings were more frequently forced to accommo-
date others' interests. (They may have also been smarter.) What-
ever the reason, Montana's cattle kings approached range con-
flicts in a different manner. Granville Stuart, for example, advo-
cated encouraging employees to own cattle to give them an inter-
est in the range." As his son-in-law later stated, "This would
133. Acting Governor Amos Barber learned of the events and, rather than calling
out the national guard unit at Buffalo, wired President William Henry Harrison in
Washington, D.C. that "an insurrection exists in Johnson County in the state of Wyo-
ming . . . against the government of said state. . . . Open hostilities exist and large
bodies of armed men are engaged in battle." Id. at 224; see LARSON, supra note 120,
at 278. Barber asked Harrison to send federal troops from Fort McKinney (near
Buffalo) to suppress the insurrection claiming the state militia was unavailable. See
LARSON, supra note 120, at 278. Wyoming's two Senators, Joseph M. Carey and F.E.
Warren, both allied with the cattle kings, joined Barber's appeals in person, reported-
ly getting President Harrison out of bed. See id.; SMITH, supra note 120, at 224. A
detachment of cavalry was sent out at 2:00 a.m. The federal troops took the Invad-
ers into custody at Fort McKinney, both to protect them from the citizens and for
the murders they had committed during the first stage of the Invasion. See LARSON,
supra note 120, at 278; SMITH, supra note 121, at 225-26. The cavalry and the
maneuverings of the Invaders' powerful backers kept them from legal sanctions, and
the Invaders and their friends secured removal of the trial to Cheyenne, an area of
Invader sympathy. See SMITH, supra note 120, at 263. Johnson County remained,
however, responsible for the costs of holding the Invaders and when it was unable to
pay those costs, all were released on bond. See LARSON, supra note 120, at 279.
Witnesses were kidnapped, and other unscrupulous methods were used to ensure
acquittals. See SMITH, supra note 120, at 245-51. After extensive delay, the trial
began with an attempt to seat a jury. After examination of more than a thousand
veniremen, only 11 jurors qualified. With all 23 defendants still to exercise their 12
preemptory challenges each, and the prosecution yet to use any of its 138 preempto-
ry challenges, Johnson County gave up and the defendants were released. The de-
fense objected to the dismissal on grounds that jeopardy had not attached and the
defendants might be tried in the future. So, a spectator was sworn as the twelfth
juror and the prosecution again moved to dismiss. This left the defendants immune
from future prosecution. See SMITH, supra note 120, at 281-82. The Invaders have
largely lost the historical battle over the legitimacy of their actions. Most twentieth
century authors have condemned the Invaders. See LEWIS L. GOULD, WYOMING: A
POLITICAL HISTORY, 1868-1896 137-58 (1968).
134. A combination of their own mistakes and their rescue by federal troops kept
the death toll relatively low. The Johnson County sheriff, Red Angus, one of the local
officials marked for death by the Invaders, played a crucial role in rallying the popu-
lation against the Invaders. See SMITH, supra note 120, at 214-17.
135. See id. at 28-29.
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do more than anything else to stop rustling."'38 This and other
similar measures made control over mavericks "decentralized
and democratic."'37 As a result, when the Montana cattlemen
did turn to extra-legal action against rustlers, as they did in the
mid-1880s, they did so with widespread popular support."
c. Lessons from History
There is a resemblance between the actions of the Johnson
County Invaders and the views of Waco and Ruby Ridge that is
common among the Militias. A government that has grown too
large in relation to individuals is not merely an inconvenience or
the source of irritants, it is a danger to the lives and property of
its citizens. The Johnson County War suggests two ways to avoid
such disastrous events.
First, the key difference between Wyoming and the other
free range cattle states was the monopoly on political power the
Invaders and their supporters held in Wyoming. This difference
led to the Invasion because the Wyoming cattle kings were never
forced to compromise with the settlers or to see them as possess-
ing legitimate rights. The cattle kings were able to envision mass
slaughter as both permissible and moral. Where there was a
political need for compromise, as in Montana, the ranchers fol-
lowed more open policies which allowed recognition and protec-
tion of settler rights. As Helen Huntington Smith observed:
"Funny how much less trouble with rustling they had in Mon-
tana."'39 Preventing concentrated power, one of the Militias'
potential roles, thus serves as an important structural function.
Second, the residents of Johnson County avoided their
planned "extermination" because they were a well-armed militia.
Indeed, the Invaders took many steps to prevent the Johnson
County residents from mobilizing as a militia, such as cutting
telegraph wires, amending the militia statutes, and planning to
seize the armories. Nonetheless, the armed citizenry successfully
resisted tyranny. The story of the Invasion supports the Militias'
call for a citizenry prepared to resist tyranny. Indeed, the Inva-
sion suggests that the proper question is not "can tyranny de-
serving of armed resistance arise in the United States?" but "will
136. Id. at 29.
137. Id. at 63.
138. See Oscar 0. Mueller, The Central Montana Vigilante Raids of 1884, THE
MONTANA MAGAZINE OF HISTORY, Jan. 1951, at 23, 34-35.
139. SMITH, supra note 120, at 29.
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it do so again?"
B. Correcting Structural Imbalances
Whether or not the Militias have identified the causes of
structural imbalance, they have identified serious problems
which are well within the scope of more conventional political
discourse. However, the solutions are not straightforward. Many
of these problems are difficult or impossible to reverse and re-
quire a means of restoring balance other than turning back the
clock."4 The solutions must accommodate a complex world in
which there are common global problems and economic interde-
pendencies within the framework of a limited government.
One way to restore the balance would be through conven-
tional political action, such as by seeking constitutional amend-
ments or electing sympathizers to public office."' Critics fre-
quently ask why the Militias do not confine themselves to such
conventional tacts. The implicit answer seems to be that the loss
of balance is too severe to be corrected by such means. Moreover,
one of the functions of constitutions is to establish and maintain
that balance; when a constitutional order malfunctions, correct-
ing it with conventional intraconstitutional political means is
difficult if not impossible."
140. Robert Higgs, for example, concludes CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN by saying that
while we know little about the future we do know that
other great crises will come. Whether they will be occasioned by foreign
wars, economic collapse, or rampant terrorism, no one can predict with
assurance. Yet in one form or another, great crises will surely come again,
as they have from time to time throughout all human history. When they
do, governments almost certainly will gain new powers over economic and
social affairs.
HIGGS, supra note 15, at 262.
141. They have had some limited success in electing sympathetic members of
Congress. Representatives Helen Chenoweth, Linda Smith, and Steve Stockman have
been identified as sympathetic to Militias. See RIDGEWAY, supra note 59, at 22.
142. The constitution is hard to change through the amendment process. That is
part of the point of having a constitution. As Don Boudreaux and A. C. Pritchard
point out, the requirement of approval of three-fourths of the state legislatures "effec-
tively bars proposed amendments which, if enacted, would directly transfer wealth
from society at large to a concentrated interest group." Donald J. Boudreaux & A. C.
Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of the Constitutional
Amendment Process, 62 FoRDHAm L. REV. 111, 129 (1993). Because the constitution
can be amended solely by agents of the people, however, the obstacles created by
Article V cannot prevent shirking. Shirking can take two forms: enacting amend-
ments that are opposed by a majority (or large minority) of the people or failing to
enact amendments that are supported by a supermajority of the people. See id. at
130.
At the same time, the constitution is relatively easy to change by changing the
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As noted earlier, the written constitution is only part of the
broader fabric of allocations of power which perform structural
functions in our system. There is no Article V for our frayed
social capital, however, and no action will reverse the trends so
aptly captured by Putnam's image of "Bowling Alone."" Once
decentralized, voluntary organizations have weakened or van-
ished, and recreating them poses almost insurmountable prob-
lems.'" The Militias are capable of playing a role in rebuilding
Supreme Court's interpretation of it. The "switch in time that saved nine" is only the
most famous and abrupt shift; the Court has significantly changed the meaning of
the Constitution on a number of occasions, such as Roe v. Wade's
constitutionalization of the abortion debate. These changes are not random in direc-
tion, however. Although we have no analysis of the judicial branch equivalent to
public choice analysis of the political branches, the structure of constitutional litiga-
tion imposes a bias on the types of changes the judiciary is able to impose.
Constitutional questions arise only when they are presented to the courts in
response to an action by the legislative or executive branches. The courts' analyses of
those actions are then shaped by legal doctrines which limit the courts' powers, like
the presumption of constitutionality. The courts must also work within the confines
of weak tools for confronting the other branches: the rational relationship test, for
example. The ineffectualness of the Supreme Court to change behavior was made
clear by Professor Gerald Rosenberg. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE
(1991). Professor Rosenberg traced how the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), led to little change in the experience of an
integrated environment by school children; it was only when Congress conditioned
federal funds on desegregation that meaningful change occurred. See id. at 42-54; see,
e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 484 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed.
1888) ("The judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of
power."). Courts thus confront legislation and executive action on terms largely set by
the legislative and executive branches. They confront those actions with weak powers
and moral authority, not, as Andrew Jackson famously noted, with the means to
enforce their decisions. See 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY 219 (1922). Those confrontations tend, therefore, to lead to a gradual
expansion of legislative and executive power and, most importantly, of federal power.
The combination of the difficulties in changing the constitution by amendment and
the relative ease in changing it through judicial means that restricting federal power
within the constitutional system is difficult. It is not impossible, as the United States
v. Lopez decision, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995), demonstrates. However, the reaction to that
limited shift away from federalization suggests the rarity of such changes. See, e.g.,
Linda Greenhouse, Focus on Federal Power, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1995, at Al (quot-
ing Laurence Tribe saying "[i]t is hard to overstate the importance of how close . . .
[the Supreme Court] came to something radically different from the modern under-
standing of the Constitution"). In general, we cannot rely on the federal government
to voluntarily limit its own authority.
143. "Bowling Alone:" An Interview With Robert Putnam About America's Collaps-
ing Civic Life (visited Sept. 6, 1996) <httpJ/muse.jhu.edu/demo/journal of democracy/
v006/putnam.interview.html> (on file with the Montana Law Review).
144. One major problem is the extent to which State-based solutions "crowd out"
voluntary action. If we insist on the existence of a full scale private solution to all
problems before withdrawing the State, we can never act; yet if we withdraw the
State before a solution exists, we risk serious consequences for those who fall be-
tween the gaps while private solutions develop.
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social capital because they are decentralized, voluntary organiza-
tions. The appearance of such groups should, therefore, be cause
for optimism rather than hysteria.
The Militias' commitment to disaster relief is a good exam-
ple of concrete actions that rebuild social capital."4s Federal di-
saster relief is a solution to a national free rider problem,"
which can be articulated as follows: we are all better off if we
can rely on others to help us in times of need, but we are each
presented with significant personal incentives to free ride in the
production of disaster relief services. As one solution to solve the
free rider problem, we allow the government to take our money
to fund the services in return for the assurance that the services
will be available when we (or others we care for) need them.
Federalization has its costs, however, because once the pool of
federal resources is available, we also create an incentive to
secure those resources even if there is no natural disaster.'47 A
group which credibly committed to provide future disaster relief
services on a local level would reduce the need for outside assis-
tance.'" The key to such developments is the creation of a
credible commitment to provide resources when they are neces-
sary. If Militias are to contribute in this area, they will need to
develop means of credibly committing to continue their efforts
into the future.
Another positive role the Militias can play is to participate
in the general political discourse.49 Dialogue with those hold-
145. See, e.g., supra note 31.
146. Many people do not free ride in those areas, of course, and provide impres-
sive disaster relief services through voluntary organizations such as the American
Red Cross.
147. Hence the federal government bureaucratizes the process by designing rules
to separate the "real" disasters from merely opportunistic resource grabs. See, e.g., 44
C.F.R. § 206.46 (1995) (describing "declaration process" for certifying a "major disas-
ter or emergency" has taken place). We also create an incentive to engage in risky
behavior, such as building in flood-prone areas, since the federal disaster relief pro-
gram partially insures losses.
148. Increasing the ability of local officials to cope with disasters could then
reduce, but probably not eliminate, the need for a federal relief program. Reducing
the size of the federal program would then reduce the incentives for rent-seeking.
149. The Militia of Montana defines itself as "an educational organization dedi-
cated to the preservation of the freedoms of all citizens of the State of Montana and
of the United States of America." The Militia of Montana (visited June 18, 1996)
<http://www.nidlink.com/-bobhard/mom.html> (on file with the Montana Law Review).
See also Wayne Laugesen, Terrorism From Within: Colorado Birthplace of Radical
Groups (visited Feb. 23, 1997) <http://www.boulderweekly.com/040496/cover.html> (on
file with the Montana Law Review) (quoting Ed Dosh of the Militia of Montana: "We
are not a paramilitary organization. We exist to provide information and education.
We don't carry machine guns and we don't wear camouflage.").
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ing "fringe" positions is not solely for the benefit of those with
odd beliefs. 50 Laird Wilcox, one of the preeminent scholars of
American extremism, argues that:
Extremists sometimes fulfill a "watchdog" function in society in
that they're especially sensitive to issues concerning their par-
ticular interests. They often deal with the "hot" issues, the
controversial issues many people choose to avoid. Many social
problems were first identified by extremists, whose agitating
and propagandizing forced society to take a closer look and
then apply more moderate and realistic solutions. In point of
fact, extremists are sometimes correct.15" '
Before they can play a constructive political role, however, the
Militias must overcome a serious image problem. Only eight
percent of respondents in a national poll conducted in July 1996,
for example, said participating in a "citizens militia" was a "good
way to be involved" in their communities,152 and only sixteen
percent in a national poll conducted in April 1996 were either
"somewhat" or "very sympathetic" to "the goals and concerns of
armed citizen militia groups."'53 So long as such large percent-
ages of the public view the Militias negatively, the ability of the
Militias to influence our political dialogue is seriously compro-
mised.
The vigilante experience suggests a third role for the
Militias: individuals can overcome free rider problems in private-
ly providing law even under adverse circumstances. In doing so,
however, the Militias must remember another lesson of the vigi-
lance committees: The successful vigilante movement privately
provided law that protected individual rights which were widely
recognized and accepted as just. When the vehicle of a vigilance
committee was used as a means of thinly disguised theft and
murder, as in Johnson County, it not only failed morally but was
150. Some Militia members have what can charitably be described as odd views
of the U.S. Constitution and history. Some hold repulsive political views. Neither
disqualifies them from participating in political dialogue. Focusing on engaging in
that dialogue rather than on demonizing the Militias is harder and not nearly as
much fun, but necessary.
151. GEORGE & WILCOX, What Is Extremism? Style and Tactics Matter More
Than Goals, in AMERICAN EXTREMISTS, supra note 38, at 61-62.
152. See Roper Center Polls, supra note 4 (citing Question 24D of the
Yankelovich Partners, Inc., Time/CNN Poll).
153. 1996 Los Angeles Times polls revealed that this was a slight increase over
the previous year, when (just after the Oklahoma City bombing) only thirteen per-
cent identified themselves as sympathetic. See Roper Center Polls, supra note 4 (cit-
ing Question 77 of the 1996 poll and Question 11 of the 1995 poll).
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also less successful in achieving its goals.
Regardless of their role in the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries, the Militias fit within the customary law traditions of
the nineteenth century West."' The extension of these tradi-
tions to modern times is not surprising, given their deep connec-
tion to our national self-image." However, these traditions did
not merely justify extra-legal actions, they also restricted the
domain of extra-legal action. The right of revolution, for example,
does not mean each of us is free to rise up as individuals and
reject any constraints on our behavior, but only that when
enough of us are unjustly constrained, we can rise up together to
remove those constraints. Militia opponents often dismiss the
Militias' claims regarding the right of revolution. 5 " However,
as Professor Clark McCauley has pointed out:
If you think these [militia] people are crazy, you have to ask [if]
154. The Militias also seek to situate themselves within the traditions of citizen
resistance of the Revolutionary War, as does the larger "Patriot" movement of ultra-
conservative activists. See, e.g., HALPERN, supra note 30, at 9 (stating: 'The choice on
their part of the term Patriot, for many of them, reflects a view of themselves, or an
image that they wish to project to the public, that they are the inheritors of the
tradition of the Revolutionary War patriots.").
155. Richard Slotkin explored how many of the icons of the 19th century West
became part of our national consciousness. See generally SLOTKIN, supra note 74.
156. For example, Brian Levin of the Southern Poverty Law Center argues there
is no such right and that "it is an illegitimate claim." LEVIN, supra note 37, at 104.
Similarly, U.S. Senator Carl Levin argued:
[I]f our elected officials, at the local, state, or federal level violate the con-
stitutional rights of individual citizens, we have an independent judiciary to
protect those rights.... We don't need private armies to protect us from
the government. We are blessed with having a free ballot and an indepen-
dent judiciary.
Carl Levin, Private Militias: Who Are They, And Who Do They Represent? (visited
Sept. 4, 1996) <http://enhtech.com/veterans/vjvln4/vj4.html> (on file with the Montana
Law Review). (Levin's article embodies some of the worst characteristics of the anti-
Militia literature; it is filled with statements like this one: "In the course of an ATF
investigation in a Detroit suburb, a former militia member told agents that another
militia member had said in September 1994, 'I found out where the ATF office is,
and I'm going to find a way to take them all out." If this is the best evidence that
a U.S. Senator can find to condemn the Militia, the anti-Militia case is pretty weak.)
See also HALPERN, supra note 30, at 9-10 (The checks and balances that are built
into this system of government, and the rights of the citizenry to free speech, to a
free press, and to freely elect our representatives, provide us with the oversight to
ensure that the government does not become a tyranny.).
Conservative writer Karen MacNutt makes a similar argument: 'he Constitu-
tion is a marvelous document which institutionalized revolution. Within its pages, it
provides for the peaceful overthrow of the government every two to six years through
the electoral process." Karen L. MacNutt, Legally Speaking: Militias (visited Feb. 13,
1997), <http:/www.shadeslanding.com/firearms/macnutt.militia.html> (on file with the
Montana Law Review).
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there [is] anything the federal government could do that would
make you willing to take up arms against it. If you can answer
no, then you're entitled to think these people are crazy. But if
you say yes, then you'd better hazard a thought that [militia
members] are human beings just like you. 57
Overcoming the Collective action problems in actually implement-
ing a revolution is sufficiently daunting that the problem is like-
ly to be too little revolution rather than too much.
Of course, the Militias today face a different set of problems
than those faced in the nineteenth century American West. Most
importantly, the miners and the Vigilantes largely confronted an
absent State, and their actions filled a vacuum. The problem
today is in many respects the opposite; the State is omnipresent,
filling spaces in which it arguably does not belong. The goal is
thus to constrain the State to its proper boundaries rather than
to create a substitute for it. Although this is an important differ-
ence, it also suggests that Militias face a less substantial collec-
tive action problem than did either the miners or the Vigilantes.
The Militias need not provide a complete substitute for the
State, they need only provide a check to constrain it within its
legitimate bounds.158 The Militias offer several types of actions
that, even if they cannot fully restore the balance they seek, may
at least arrest any further imbalance.
Primarily, the mere existence of an armed group of trained
individuals deters tyranny."9 There is nothing unconventional
157. GEORGE & WILcox, supra note 38, at 270 (quoting McCauley.)
158. One commentator has examined Prisoner's Dilemmas in detail; changing the
payoffs in a Prisoner's Dilemma is one way of changing the incentives to defect. See
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 134 (1984). Axelrod notes that "it
is not necessary to go so far as to eliminate the tension between the short-run incen-
tive to defect and the longer-run incentive to achieve mutual cooperation. It is only
necessary to make the long-term incentive for mutual cooperation greater than the
short-term incentive for defection." Id. at 134. This suggests that the problems the
Militias must resolve are smaller than they appear at first.
159. The Militias have been somewhat unclear on how their deterrence function
operates. To the extent they believe the existing federal government is a tyrannical
one, it is, as one sympathetic observer has noted, "patently absurd" to simultaneously
demand the overthrow of the government and insist on the protection of the Militias'
constitutional rights. Chris Walker, Chris Walker's Views on the Militia (last modified
July 18, 1996) <http'/uts.cc.utexas.edu/-cwalker/militia/statement.html> (on file with
the Montana Law Review). Walker's statement shows a great deal of sympathy for
Militias' views on Second Amendment questions as well as on the potential for tyran-
nical behavior by the federal government. If their concern is that the government is
showing tendencies toward tyranny which need to be corrected, however, their insis-
tence on their First and Second Amendment rights can serve beneficial purposes by
forcing courts to confront the Second Amendment.
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about this argument; it is firmly rooted in the academic debate
over the Second Amendment."6 Although the Militias state it
in less polished terms, they make essentially the same argu-
ments as academics and lawyers. The argument is academically
respectable; it is also true. If the government or some group in
the government were planning or considering actions to seriously
restrict civil liberties, the potential of armed response would
certainly raise the cost of such an action and could deter it."6 '
Moreover, even if the factual predicate for the Militias' argu-
ments is incorrect,"s' the exercise of their claimed Second
Amendment rights could prompt clarification of the Second
Amendment's meaning. The United States Supreme Court has
never directly confronted most Second Amendment issues, and
actually exercising claimed rights could lead to a case clarifying
its meaning. 63
Having a reputation' of being willing to resist tyranny
160. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE
L. J. 637 (1989). Even when academics with impeccable reputations make this argu-
ment, it is not uncontroversial. For example, Brian Levin of the Southern Poverty
Law Center describes Levinson's argument as "a very dangerous theory that is anti-
thetical to the purposes of the Constitution and to our democracy. ... And the very
small handful of legal scholars and gun-rights lobbyists who are proposing the exis-
tence of a constitutional right to armed insurrection are perpetrating a dangerous
fraud upon this country." LEVIN, supra note 37, at 79-80.
161. The existence of armed response is not proof of the existence of the threat,
however, and Militias have not been convincing with generally accepted proof
grounds when they discuss the specifics of the threats, which they perceive outside of
the gun control area, such as the presence of black helicopters. Nonetheless, so long
as they confine their activities to private property where they have permission to
conduct activities or to public lands where their access is based on the same rules
that govern the general population, it is difficult to see why their training exercises
pose significant problems. Some people may feel threatened or offended by the mere
existence of militia groups, just as others feel threatened by the existence of pornog-
raphy or adulterous behavior. Senator Carl Levin, for example, objects to the state-
ment in the Southern Michigan Regional Militia's handbook that the "militia exists
in order to keep government in check." Levin, supra note 156. In a liberal society,
such objections are not entitled to much weight, however. One response, apparently
largely one of individuals operating without sanction from any of the major Militia
organizations, is to threaten individuals who work for state and federal agencies.
This is simply wrong and a violation of the rights of the threatened individuals. If
the Militias are to play a constructive political role, they must develop a means of
controlling those individuals, if any, who belong to their organizations and engage in
such behavior.
162. Examples include their claims about markings on road signs or the opera-
tions of black helicopters.
163. See generally Donald W. Dowd, The Relevance of the Second Amendment to
Gun Control Legislation, 58 MONT. L. REV. 79 (1997).
164. Reputation "is embodied in the beliefs of others about the strategy [they]
will use." AXELROD, supra note 158, at 150. The reputation of an individual or group
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can help deter tyranny. Individuals could, of course, create a
similar reputation for themselves by announcing their willing-
ness to resist particular acts."'5 It is difficult, however, for indi-
viduals to have a significant impact on large social forces like
government. A low probability of success undermines individuals'
willingness to resist, the essence of a free rider problem. Creat-
ing an organization that is capable of having a reputation is one
way in which the individual is able to both meaningfully signal
the reputation on a larger social scale and to enhance the chanc-
es of successfully implementing the strategy of resistance.
Participation in the military-style exercises which alarm
militia critics does more than prepare the participants for resist-
ing the armed force of the government, however. In Gunfighter
Nation, Richard Slotkin argued that
[w]hat is distinctively American is not necessarily the amount
or kind of violence that characterizes our history but the mythic
significance we have assigned to the kinds of violence we have
actually experienced, the forms of symbolic violence we imagine
or invent, and the political uses to which we put that symbol-
ism. "'
The military-style exercises situate the Militias within the domi-
nant myths of American culture and identify them with prior
defenses of liberty. The placement of the Militias within what
Slotkin terms a "common mythic language" is an important part
of bringing the Militias within our ongoing constitutional and
political dialogue." 7 As Slotkin notes, "[i]t is the existence of
thus plays a significant role in how others interact with the individual or group, as
those others consider how the individual or group will respond to their actions.
165. For example, displaying a bumper sticker which states, "they will get my
gun when they pry it from my cold, dead fingers" signals a fnn opposition to gun
confiscation measures.
166. SLOTKIN, supra note 74, at 13.
167. The adherence to unconventional political and historical beliefs, some of
which are simply wrong, may play a role in increasing group cohesion. See, e.g.
HALPERN, supra note 30, at 26 ("Some of these conspiracy scenarios do play an im-
portant role in recruiting new members. If you believe that the government is build-
ing concentration camps, you naturally are frightened of that prospect and probably
want to do something about it."). Id.
Such beliefs are common among extremist groups of all types. See GEORGE &
WILCOX, supra note 38, at 9. The belief of some Militias members, for example, that
we are living under a state of national emergency created by Franklin Roosevelt
which has suspended the constitution itself serves a function despite its falseness
because it motivates members to participate as well as to identify other sympathetic
individuals with whom to cooperate. This theory is described in EUGENE SCHRODER,
CONSTITUTION: FACT OR FICTION (1995) and Eugene Schroder, Emergency War Powers,
4 ANTISHYSTER (No. 2) 43-38 (1994). A portion of this book is available at Eugene
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this common mythic language, to which all sides can appeal, that
makes the conflict of progressive and populist interests a coher-
ent political discourse-a political culture-rather than a clash of
mutually uncomprehending and irreconcilable tribes."' Unfor-
tunately, to some nonmembers, these exercises situate the
Militias within an alternative set of symbols with less positive
connotations. One important task for the Militias is therefore to
recapture their public images and reposition themselves as part
of this dialogue rather than as part of the tradition of violence
associated with, for example, the Klan. Moreover, group training
also reinforces the sense of group identification. Indeed, Profes-
sor James Aho "feels that a primary function of the militias is as
a social activity involving like-minded friends."169 The Militias
thus can and do serve the function of rebuilding social capital.
Militia groups do more than evoke the Second Amendment;
they also distribute materials, make presentations, appear in the
media, and so forth. This is clearly within the mainstream of
political action in the United States, and to the extent that mate-
rials they distribute or views they propound are objectionable,
foolish, or inaccurate, the remedy is the traditional one of more
speech to cure the problem. These activities produce a reputation
for the Militias that signals to nonmembers whether the Militias
offer a means for accomplishing change with which the nonmem-
bers wish to ally themselves. 7 ' Here the public perception of
Schroder, Emergency War Powers (visited Aug. 25, 1995) <http://www.afcomm.
comi/factfiction/factfict.html> (on file with the Montana Law Review). This particular
belief is under challenge within the Militia movement. See, e.g., Jon Rolland, Texas
Militia, Letter to Eugene Schroder (visited May 14, 1995) <http'J/ www.constitu-
tion.org/ltr/5514schr.html> (on file with the Montana Law Review). Other far-right
organizations, such as the John Birch Society, have also rejected Schroder's theory.
See generally Thomas A. Burzynski, Is the Constitution Suspended?, THE NEW AMERI-
CAN, Feb. 5, 1996.
Overcoming a free rider problem is not the end in itself. Despite this positive
role in overcoming free rider problems, the persistence of such beliefs is disturbing
for several reasons. First, promulgating or acquiescing in the promulgation of false
beliefs about history is wrong. Even Militia allies like Robert Brown, publisher of
Soldier of Fortune magazine, has noted that many of the militia leaders propounding
conspiracy theories are "full of [blank]." GEORGE & WILCOX, supra note 38, at 266
(quoting Robert Brown) (omission in original). Second, such false beliefs accelerate
the breakdown of society by distorting our common past. Third, not only do they not
further our understanding of the political problems we face, but it distorts the solu-
tions devised. Energies devoted to ending non-existent or irrelevant states of national
emergency are energies not devoted to real solutions. Finally, it marginalizes the
Militias, restricting their ability to accomplish their goals.
168. SLOTKIN, supra note 74, at 24.
169. GEORGE & WILCOX, supra note 38, at 249.
170. The Militia organizations offer a means of public commitment to their vision
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the Militias, rather than the reality of the Militias,171 is criti-
cal, and the Militias are losing the battle for control of their
reputation. To the extent that the Militias' reputations are those
of crazed, racist, anti-Semitic nuts, the potential for alliance with
others with whom they share some common aims will be limit-
ed.' Unfortunately, such a reputation also will enhance the
of a limited government, enhancing their ability to motivate members to participate.
Voluntarily assumed characteristics can act as quasi-labels. Axelrod defines labels as
fixed characteristics which can be observed by others, like sex or skin color. See
AXELROD, supra note 158, at 145-46. Although new labels cannot be created (previ-
ously unrecognized characteristics can be endowed with new meaning), people can
create something similar by voluntarily assuming characteristics, such as distinctive
dress or beliefs. Wearing a fraternity ring, for example, signals to others that you
are a member of a group. This can have significant advantages in overcoming free
rider problems because the pre-existing group relationship provides an incentive to
internalize the well-being of others in the group. The role of the Masons in the Mon-
tana Vigilance Committee is such an example. See supra note 49 and accompanying
text. Unlike sex or skin color, of course, a Militia member can shed his quasi-label
by withdrawing from the Militia. The ability to shed the quasi-label is actually an
advantage for it prevents the development of the bad consequences of labels identi-
fied by Axelrod. AXELROD, supra note 158, at 148-50 (discussing drawbacks of labels).
However, the creation of the quasi-label can help overcome the free rider problems in
organizing collective action.
171. Just who are the members of the Militias is hard to say and depends on
how "member" and "Militia" are defined. See GEORGE & WILCOX, supra note 38, at
255-60. George and Wilcox, who have studied the movement as extensively as anyone
and who bring to the subject a rare degree of objectivity, suggest:
The movement consists primarily of white males between thirty and sixty,
although a surprising number of women are active, too. Several blacks have
been identified with militias, along with a few Asians, American Indians,
and even some Jews. Most militia activists appear to have roots in their
communities, with families, jobs, and children in school.
Id. at 249. They go on to categorize the beliefs of militia members as "generally
conservative in outlook, although not very ideological." Id.
The negative images of militia groups have even entered popular fiction. Anne
Rice's latest novel, for example, opens with a recitation of how the world "seemed
just a little more mad than usual," which includes mention of what is "believed" to
be militia involvement in the Oklahoma City bombing: "In Oklahoma City, a Federal
office building had been blown sky high-and not by alien terrorists, it was believed,
but by our own Americans, members of the militia movement they were called."
ANNE RICE, SERVANT OF THE BONES 5 (1996). Rice's narrator goes on to compare the
militia unfavorably to "the hippies of years before" who, the narrator says, "had
merely lain on railroad tracks and sung in ranks" while "these new crewcut mili-
tants .. . killed our own people. By the hundreds." Id.
172. Having a limited appeal may not prevent the Militias from having an im-
pact. Even a small number of well trained, armed individuals could, after all, sig-
nificantly raise the cost of imposing tyranny. However, to the extent that members
have more ambitious goals in restoring constitutional balance, they will have to reach
beyond their current membership. Militias and their leaders have also begun to play
a role in mediating conflicts between law enforcement groups and others. At times
Militia members play a direct role in negotiations, at times they seek to deter over-
reaction by State law enforcement agencies by their presence at the scene of confron-
PRIVATE ACTORS
chances of alliances with actual crazed, racist, anti-Semitic nuts,
further weakening the Militias' abilities to create positive
change. 
173
Finally, the Militias can help to make the future more im-
portant relative to the present, which enhances cooperation be-
cause it allows the use of the threat of future retaliation to en-
sure cooperation today.174 The future can become more impor-
tant in political terms if the voters are able to commit to future
action based on politicians' current actions.175 By continuing to
raise structural balance issues, the Militias increase the likeli-
hood of both members and nonmembers alike paying attention to
such issues at the next election. Politicians seeking votes, there-
fore, may become more sensitive to such issues even if Militias
continue to reject direct political involvement.
III. CONCLUSION
The complex problems facing our society and the difficulties
we have in adapting our form of government to the modern
world have produced the Militias. The Militia Movement is as
complicated as the problems that created it, and it reflects the
strengths and weaknesses of our society as a whole. While valu-
able themselves, the Militias' responses to societal imbalances
are inadequate to secure the Militias' primary goal of restoring
balance to government. What then can the Militias do?
Confronted with the problem of a government which has lost
its internal structural balance, the Militias present a partial
solution. Even if they cannot by themselves resolve all the prob-
tations. Both of these functions are potentially valuable, although Militias need to be
careful in choosing the circumstances of their interventions if they are to be able to
engage nonmembers in dialogue.
173. Laird Wilcox argues that extremism is identified more by its style than by
the content of extremists beliefs. The extremist style "hampers our understanding of
important issues, muddies the waters of discourse with invective, defamation, self-
righteousness, fanaticism, and hatred, and impairs our ability to make intelligent,
well-informed choices." See GEORGE & WILCOX, supra note 38, at 55. Unfortunately,
much of the publicity surrounding the Militias suggests the presence of a style that
fits Wilcox's description of extremism: intolerance, disregard for the rights of others,
and taking a political idea to its limits. See id. at 54. To the extent that the Militias
are utilizing this extremist style, and much of it may be attributed to media reports,
they need to move beyond it.
174. See AXELROD, supra note 158, at 126.
175. The Michigan Militia Corps, for example, distributes a weekly e-mail
newsletter which includes political analysis. These can be found at Weekly Update:
Michigan Militia Corps Resources (visited Feb. 13, 1997) <http'//mmc.cns.
net/update/4-4-f.html> (on file with the Montana Law Review).
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lems we face in preserving the American experiment in limited
government, they can help overcome some of the free rider prob-
lems in limiting government. The Militias have the potential to
play a significant role in restoring a balance between public and
private, authoritarian law and customary law, and State and
individual. The realization of that potential depends in part,
however, on moving beyond the contentious, conspiracy-theory-
oriented world-view to which some Militia members adhere and
developing their positive case for limited government. If the
Militias want to see a return to a government built around their
version of the vision of Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and the
other Founders, they must articulate a positive case for that
vision which goes beyond nostalgia.
Most importantly, however, the Militias offer a challenge to
American society: if we believe in limited government, we must
design ways to restore the balance of competing forces by which
we have historically limited our governments' reach. Those who
believe in limited government ought to welcome the Militias'
involvement while we travel the same path. At the same time,
we should not hesitate to condemn them when they turn to re-
pulsive paths defined by racism or anti-Semitism.'76
176. Some critics of the Militias who share some of its distrust of the state have
argued that the proper response is to "know what this movement is and criticize it
rather than look for affinities with it." Janet Biehl, Militia Fever: The Fallacy of
'Neither Left nor Right,' 37 GREEN PERSPECTIVES 1, (visited Sept. 4, 1996)
<httpj/nwcitizen.com/publicgood/reports/milfev2.html> (on file with the Montana Law
Review).
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